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INTRODUCTION

Interest groups and policymakers agree that there is a medical
liability problem in the United States, but they are deeply divided
concerning the nature of the problem and the choice of measures to
address it.1 Physicians and many politicians point to high jury awards
as the cause of rising malpractice insurance premiums. Doctors warn
that unaffordable premiums will drive them out of high-risk specialties
and away from underserved communities. Proponents of reform
argue that the fear of malpractice suits leads physicians to practice
"defensive medicine" by performing unneeded tests and procedures.2
At the same time, recent studies have suggested that there is a high
incidence of medical error, and that most patients who are injured by
medical negligence never seek compensation.3 Underclaiming by
patients with valid claims results in undercompensation of those
patients, and-some argue-in underdeterrence of physicians whose
performance may be substandard.
The sense of crisis drives a number of current proposals for change.
Bills aimed at medical liability reform are pending in Congress and in
state legislatures around the country. Much of the public debate
1. The lack of consensus is not new. See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
Medical Malpractice: No Agreement on the Problems or Solutions, GAO/HRD Rep.
86-50, at 3 (1986) ("GAO found no agreement among the major interest groups
surveyed regarding the problems, their severity, their solutions, or the proper role of
states or the federal government.").
2. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive
Medicine?, 111 Q.J. Econ. 353, 388 (1996) ("We conclude that treatment of elderly
patients with heart disease does involve 'defensive' medical practices, and that limited
reductions in liability can reduce these costly practices."). But see Michelle M. Mello
& Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for
Malpractice Reform, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1595, 1607 (2002) ("It is likely that defensive
medicine, to the extent that it ever took place, has diminished over time in response
to the growing presence of managed care.").
3. See infra text accompanying notes 172-75.
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focuses on capping damages-in order to curb jury awards-and on
limiting contingent fees-in order to limit the compensation paid to
plaintiffs' attorneys.
Several notable reforms address not the substantive law of medical
malpractice, but rather the proceduresby which that substantive law is
enforced.4 For example, twenty states provide for "medical screening
panels," staffed partly or wholly by physicians, to consider evidence
and opine on liability (and sometimes damages).5 A number of states
have tightened the requirements concerning expert witness
qualifications.6 More than one state has revised its remittitur standard
to make it more likely that courts will require plaintiffs to accept a
reduced damages award (or face a new trial).7 Another proposal
would create a special court system dedicated to hearing medical
malpractice claims; both state legislators and a nationally prominent
reform organization have proposed such a system, though no
jurisdiction has yet adopted it.8
The procedural reforms described above affect varying stages and
aspects of malpractice litigation, but they share a common theme:
Each springs from the perception that participants in such litigation
need greater expertise. Some reformers focus, in particular, on the
need for medical expertise. In many malpractice cases, each element
of the claim-standard of care, breach, causation, and damagesrequires medical expert testimony.9 Party-retained experts are the
standard source of such expertise in the United States. Critics argue
that the use of partisan expertise permits plaintiffs to bring meritless
claims and deludes juries into rewarding such claims with mistaken
verdicts. ° Some commentators assert that plaintiffs can find venal or
ignorant experts to support almost any position;1 that judges lack the
4. Obviously, procedure and substance blend into one another. Nonetheless, for
purposes of this Article, I use the following distinction: "[T]he basic thrust of
substantive rules-controlling.., behavior in society-is primary, while procedural
rules are secondary, and are invoked only in connection with litigation." Richard L.
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospectsfor ProceduralProgress,59 Brook.
L. Rev. 761, 777 (1993).
5. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1303.512 (West Supp. 2003) (setting
qualifications for experts in medical malpractice cases).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 301-02, 353-54.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 282-86.
9. Other types of expert testimony may also be presented-for example, the
parties may retain economists to testify concerning future damages.
10. See Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 723, 731
(1992). Huber argues, with respect to tort claims, that "[m]ost juries decide cases in a
way that is consistent with mainstream science. But some do not, delivering
substantial payoffs for questionable claims." Id.
11. Such concerns extend beyond the context of medical malpractice litigation.
See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals
Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in
Common Law Courts, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1989) (discussing causation testimony
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ability to screen out suspect testimony; and that juries lack 1the
2
capacity to assess the competing claims offered by partisan experts.
Such critiques drive several of the procedural reforms. The findings
of medical screening panels could provide a putatively neutral source

of expertise at trial. 3 Stringent requirements for the qualifications of

expert witnesses might eliminate some faulty testimony.'4 Judges on a
specialized medical liability court might be particularly skilled at
determining the quality of proposed expert testimony. 5 A revised
remittitur standard holds the promise of improving damages
6

determinations by empowering judges to reduce outlier jury awards.1
To assess how best to incorporate medical expertise into

malpractice litigation, policymakers should consider the role
physicians should play in determining medical liability. A key
question here, as elsewhere in health law, is the extent to which lay
decision makers 7 should delegate authority to medical professionals. 8
Should judges rely on the medical community to determine whether a
medical witness is qualified, or should judges independently assess the
witness's qualifications? Should the court system call upon other

physicians in the community to assess the merits of the case? Should
the decision maker be swayed by concern that a malpractice verdict

might prompt physicians to leave an underserved community?
Policymakers should also ask whether the adversarial system
provides the best means for conveying expert knowledge to the jury.
Partisan experts may be biased in favor of the parties who retain
in toxic tort litigation and noting that "[j]udges fear that juries can be misled by highly
paid experts who will find at least some support in the voluminous scientific literature
for any position, even when that position is repudiated by the majority of scientists");
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1130 ("Some expert can
almost always be found to testify to any plausible (and many implausible) expert
opinions; if nothing else, a friendly expert can serve to undermine any expert who
testifies for the opposition.").
12. See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26
J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 267, 275 (2001) (noting the argument "that jurors lacking
scientific or technical expertise have relied on irrational, superficial criteria to assess
the believability of experts").
13. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
14. See Huber, supra note 10, at 749 (applauding state laws that tighten
qualification requirements for experts in medical malpractice cases).
15. See infra text accompanying note 292.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 353-54.
17. My reference to "lay decision makers" includes judges, because judgesthough they possess legal training-generally lack medical training.
18. I am indebted to Jay Gold's thoughtful discussion of this insight as it relates to
several areas of health law. See Jay Alexander Gold, Wiser Than the Laws?: The
Legal Accountability of the Medical Profession, 7 Am. J.L. & Med. 145, 145 (1981)
(arguing "that many seemingly disparate questions in health law are related to the
issue of how experts are to be held accountable to non-experts-how the principle
that decisions should be made by those most affected is to be reconciled with the
principle that decisions should be made by those with experience and training in the
area").
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them.19 Judges who view themselves as neutral, passive umpires may
be less likely to take an active role in screening and channeling expert

testimony. The standard structure of adversarial trials may make it
difficult for juries to understand and assess such testimony.
The last two questions relate closely to one another. Reforms that
aim to replace, or supplement, the partisan "battle of the experts"
with nonpartisan medical expertise may result in an increased

delegation of authority to the medical community, or parts of it.20 A
court-appointed expert might convey a view dominant in the medical
community, to the exclusion of dissenting views.2 ' A medical
screening panel composed of local physicians might give local medical

communities significant influence over jury determinations concerning
the liability of another member of the same community.22
In this Article, I contend that policymakers should assess the

question of procedural reform within the larger context of the
relationship between physicians and society. In Part I, I argue that a

proper understanding of that relationship requires consideration of
doctors' experiences not only in recent decades but also in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Such an inquiry discloses
some basis for doctors' distrust of the litigation system, but it also
suggests that the medical community should not be given undue
control over the choice and content of medical evidence in
malpractice litigation. Part I also discusses the fact that complaints

about partisan expert testimony have deep roots in nineteenth century
medical jurisprudence.
Nineteenth century medico-legal writers advanced conceptual
critiques of the adversary system and supported their assessments with
anecdotal evidence. We now possess a wealth of empirical data

against which to test their claims.

Part II surveys existing studies

concerning the performance of judges and juries in medical
malpractice and other complex cases. It also briefly reviews the
available data on the procedural reforms mentioned above, and closes
19. Researchers who surveyed practicing lawyers and federal trial judges in the
late 1990s asked respondents to indicate how frequently they had encountered each of
a list of twelve possible difficulties with respect to expert witnesses; the problem
identified by both groups as most frequent was "[e]xperts abandon objectivity and
become advocates for the side that hired them." Carol Krafka et al., Judge and
Attorney Experiences, Practices,and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal
Civil Trials, 8 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 309, 314, 316, 328 (2002) (using a scale of
from "1 (very infrequent) to 5 (very frequent)" and reporting mean scores-with
respect to the objectivity issue-of 3.69 from judicial respondents and 3.72 from
attorney respondents).
20. Thus, for example, a jury might give more weight to the views of a courtappointed expert or a medical screening panel than to the views of a party-retained
expert witness, because the jury might view the court-appointed expert or the
screening panel as less biased.
21. See infra text accompanying note 337.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 278-79.
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by considering the promise of those reforms as well as possible
alternatives.
My discussion thus far has assumed that the relevant procedural
reforms should be assessed as they relate to medical malpractice
litigation in particular. This focus raises the question whether
litigation procedures should be trans-substantive, or whether they
should be substance-specific. In Part III, I contend that the problem
of medical liability merits consideration of reforms aimed specifically
at medical malpractice cases. However, studying proposed reforms in
the light of their relation to medical liability in particular does not
mean that the resulting reforms necessarily should apply only to
malpractice cases, or that such reforms should apply to all malpractice
cases. Some of the changes considered in this Article may also be
useful in other fields, such as products liability. Conversely, the
difficulty of the issues in medical malpractice cases varies widely, and
reforms that may be worthwhile in more complex malpractice cases
may be superfluous, or even counterproductive, in simpler disputes.
I. THE LESSONS OF THE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH
CENTURIES

Consider the following summary of malpractice liability and
Improvements in medical knowledge and
medical evidence:
technology have heightened consumer expectations, and have led to
lawsuits over imperfect results where previously-under less
sophisticated treatment-no suit would have been possible. Doctors
complain that the threat of malpractice litigation is forcing them to
leave risky specialties or else to make undesirable treatment choices.
Doctors charge that the outcomes in malpractice suits are random
because plaintiffs frequently bring meritless claims, lawyers can buy
the testimony of disreputable experts, and judges and juries are
incompetent to assess medical testimony. Critics suggest that the
adversary litigation system is a poor choice for determining
malpractice claims. They assert that determining whether a doctor
breached the standard of care is a delicate question, because of the
inherent difficulty and uncertainty of medical judgments. They
propose that alternatives-such as delegating medical judgments to
expert panels-could help.
This description highlights some of the key complaints about
today's malpractice liability system; but such a description would have
been equally familiar to a doctor in the mid-to-late-nineteenth
century. Accounts of the current medical malpractice problem usually
begin their narrative, at the earliest, with the mid-twentieth century.23
23. Cf. James C. Mohr, Doctors and the Law: Medical Jurisprudence in
Nineteenth-Century America 255 (1993) (noting that Americans "have seldom
viewed" the medical malpractice issue "as the product of specific nineteenth-century
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I argue in this part that a thorough assessment of medical malpractice
issues should include consideration of the events of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries as well.
In Part I.A., I detail the rise of malpractice litigation in the
nineteenth century, and I note evidence of physicians' responses to
that litigation. In Part I.B., I consider nineteenth century doctors'
critiques of the litigation system, both with respect to malpractice
litigation and with respect to the experience of medical expert
witnesses more generally. I also discuss the (usually unflattering)
comparisons drawn between the United States system and the systems
established in France and Germany, and I survey nineteenth century
proposals for changing the United States adversarial system of expert
evidence.
Those proposals failed; in Part I.C., I describe the
introduction of other means by which the medical profession
attempted to protect its members from malpractice liability. I bring
the discussion up to the present time, in Part I.D., by summarizing
some aspects of medical self-regulation in the twentieth century, as
well as developments that brought greater external control over the
profession.
A. Medical Malpractice Litigationin the Nineteenth Century
In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, physicians
medical liability crisis. Some apparently responded
treatments or specialties that they thought entailed a
litigation; others proposed that the profession take
defensive measures.

perceived a
by avoiding
high risk of
coordinated

1. The Increase in Claiming
Though data concerning the incidence of malpractice suits in the
nineteenth century are scarce,24 it seems clear that the frequency of
such suits rose markedly beginning in the 1830s and 1840s.25 In his
informative book on nineteenth century medical malpractice suits,

historical circumstances or placed it in the larger context of evolving relations
between American physicians and the nation's legal processes").
24. Cf John J. Elwell, A Medico-Legal Treatise on Malpractice and Medical
Evidence, Comprising the Elements of Medical Jurisprudence 70 (1860) ("The
reported cases on the subject of Malpractice are few, as they but seldom reach the
Supreme courts.").
25. See Kenneth Allen De Ville, Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth-Century
America: Origins and Legacy 25 (1990) ("Although medical malpractice suits were
virtually nonexistent between 1790 and 1835, thereafter patients suddenly began to
sue their physicians at an increasing and unprecedented rate."); see also Mohr, supra
note 23, at 111 ("After 1840 the frequency of malpractice actions shot suddenly
upward, and well-established physicians, not charlatans, found themselves the targets
of an almost revolutionary and certainly unprecedented surge in malpractice
accusations.").
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Kenneth Allen De Ville argues that a combination of medical and
social factors prompted the increase in malpractice claims.
The shortcomings of medical technology played a role, because
some medical practices were quite harmful to the patient.26 At the
same time, progress in medical knowledge also led to malpractice
suits. In particular, advances in the treatment of fractures led
physicians to save limbs, rather than amputate them-with the result
that suits might be brought for limbs that healed imperfectly. 27 As one
standard text noted at mid-century:
It is well known, that fractures and dislocations, when cured, are
often attended either with some slight deformity of the limb, or with
some impairment of its functions. This result is occasionally
inevitable under the best treatment; but it is commonly set down as
a sign of unskillfulness in the medical attendant. Actions for
malapraxis are instituted, and in spite of good evidence in his favor,
the surgeon is sometimes heavily fined for a result which could not
be avoided. 8
Changes in the business of medicine fostered suits, because the
increasing number of physicians made suits against a given doctor
more palatable to the public 9 and because some physicians may have
aided malpractice suits against competitors. 0
26. See De Ville, supra note 25, at 68 (arguing that "heroic" medical treatments
were "the object of considerable derision and one of the main sources of public
antipathy toward the profession"). Continental medicine in the early nineteenth
century apparently was open to similar charges; discussing public mortality in France,
Foder6 asserted that standard medical treatments for children and adolescents often
did more harm than good. See 5 F.E. Foder6, Trait6 de Mrdecine Ldgale et d'Hygi~ne
Publique, ou de Police de Sant 84-85 (2d ed. 1813).
Public sentiment sometimes posed an obstacle to medical progress: Doctors
complained that public opposition to the dissection of cadavers kept them at a
disadvantage, by preventing them from improving their understanding of the human
body. See De Ville, supra note 25, at 70 ("Medical societies and contemporary
observers argued that physicians would be subject to malpractice suits if they did not
understand the workings of the human body and yet were being denied the primary
source of that knowledge."). In France, Foderd had proposed a chilling alternative
method for obtaining medical knowledge: He advocated trying new remedies and
operations on those condemned to death or to life imprisonment. See 6 Foder6, supra,
at 427 ("To risk such experiments on free men goes against justice and humanity, and
it would conflict with neither of those principles to do such things to criminals already
condemned to death .,.. " (author's translation)).
27. See De Ville, supra note 25, at 100 ("Though unnecessary or incompetent
amputations were seldom penalized, physicians who saved limbs with compound or
complex fractures were regularly sued."); see also Mohr, supra note 23, at 114
("Improved techniques and more careful training produced an advance; but because
the consequences of the advance were often imperfect, those who tried to save limbs
in difficult cases often found themselves being sued.").
28. Alfred S. Taylor, Medical Jurisprudence 320 (2d Am. ed. 1850); see also Henry
F. Campbell, The President's Address, 4 JAMA 477, 484 (1885) ("Unavoidable
deformities and disabilities remaining after the treatment of fractures and dislocations
have been made the most frequent occasions for arraignment of the surgeon .....
29. As De Ville explains:
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Social views contributed to the increase as well, because of greater
interest in physical health,3 an increased social tolerance for
litigation,32 and unrealistic expectations of what medicine could do.33
John Elwell's 1860 treatise on malpractice decried the effect of
perfectionist beliefs:
As in the case of amputations and dislocations, much error exists in
the popular or unprofessional mind, as to what the surgeon can
really do in the treatment of fractures. It has been generally
supposed, if the patient is healthy at the time of the accident, that a
perfect cure should be the result, if the treatment instituted is
proper. This is another of the errors that has had a serious effect
upon the profession, being often the source of ruinous litigation.34
Criminal cases might also have made the question of medical
malpractice more prominent. Medico-legal commentators observed
that in cases where a victim died after receiving medical treatment,
the defendant would likely argue that faulty treatment, rather than the
[B]y 1850 the number of physicians in some areas had increased to the point
of a glut. If a malpractice suit destroyed a physician's career, there was
always another doctor, or more, ready to take his place. In this situation,
juries and judges were less likely to shelter physicians from unhappy,
litigious patients.
De Ville, supra note 25, at 78.
30. See id. ("The surplus of physicians in many parts of the country... subverted
the medical profession's status and gave rise to malpractice suits by engendering and
exacerbating competition among regular practitioners."). A physician speaking at the
Medico-Legal Society of New York in 1871 acknowledged this suspicion:
Putting aside the loud boasters, the selfish, inconsiderate, and even ignorant
men to be found in the profession, whose conduct may sometimes deserve
the infliction of a lawsuit, I do not hesitate to assert that a very large
proportion of actions for malpractice brought against medical practitioners
are instigated by unworthy motives. Some, indeed, go further, asserting that
were the secret of such cases known it would unveil the promptings of
malevolent professional rivals. This may be true, although I prefer to think
not to the extent asserted.
James O'Dea, The Sphere, Rights, and Obligations of Medical Experts, reprinted in
Papers Read Before the Medico-Legal Society of New York, from its Organization
403, 440 (1st series, 3d illustrated ed. 1889).
31. See De Ville, supra note 25, at 92 ("Malpractice suits were, in part, an
expression of a transformed view of the human body and an unprecedented concern
for physical well-being."); Mohr, supra note 23, at 112.
32. De Ville argues:
The two essential preconditions for the rise of malpractice suits were the
dissolution of community stigmatization of certain types of litigation and the
decline in belief in the concept of providence that held misfortune to be an
expression of divine will.
Without these two underlying, long-term
developments, the widespread prosecution of physicians would have been
inconceivable.
De Ville, supra note 25, at 115.
33. See De Ville, supra note 25, at 103 (noting, with respect to the problem of
"unrealistic expectations," that "[p]hysicians and medical writers began to believe
that mechanical, standardized treatment yielded consistent, faultless cures").
34. Elwell, supra note 24, at 75.
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"The surgeon who

undertakes to dress or treat a case of criminal wounding...
assumes... more than ordinary responsibility. If his treatment is in
the least out of the usual course in either direction,-whether novel or
negligent,-it will be urged in mitigation of the crime."3 5

2. Physician Perspective
Physicians reacted strongly to the upswing in malpractice suits.
Medical writers asserted that many, if not most, suits were meritless3 6
An 1845 treatise on forensic medicine included in a list of reasons for

feigning disease: "Magnifying slight ailments or inconveniences, into
serious illness or permanent disability, with the hope of receiving
exorbitant damages from physicians for pretended malpractice."37 A
couple of decades later, John Ordronaux asserted in his treatise on

medical jurisprudence that many malpractice suits arose merely from
bad results, rather than from fault on the physician's part, and he

argued that "the physician consequently practices his art in chains,
being perpetually exposed to the risk of a suit which may ruin his
reputation as well as his fortune."3 8 Physicians suggested that some

patients brought malpractice suits in an attempt to avoid paying their
doctors' bills.39 Alfred S. Taylor, an English physician whose treatise

35. Id. at 561. English authors concurred:
It will be obvious that a serious responsibility is thrown on practitioners, who
undertake the management of a case of criminal wounding. Any deviation
from common practice should therefore be made with the greatest caution,
since novelties in practice will, in the event of death, form one of the best
grounds of defence in the hands of a prisoner's counsel.
Taylor, supra note 28, at 259; see also W. Bathurst Woodman & Charles Meymott
Tidy, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, A Comprehensive Work on Medical
Jurisprudence 635 (1882) ("In criminal trials it is often sought to fix the responsibility
of a terminal erysipelas, etc., after trephining, or similar operations, upon the surgeon
who operates, rather than upon the assailant whose violence caused the original
injury.").
36. European physicians made similar assertions. See 2 Johann Ludwig Casper, A
Handbook of the Practice of Forensic Medicine, Based Upon Personal Experience
304 (George William Balfour trans., 3d ed. 1862) (stating that "perfectly groundless
accusations" are often "made both against medical and non-medical men, dictated by
ignorance, by wrath at a supposed overcharge for attendance, or in other cases
entirely by a contemptible love of gain").
37. William A. Guy, Principles of Forensic Medicine 233 (1st Am. ed. 1845). This
treatise was written by William A. Guy, an English physician and professor of forensic
medicine. See id. at v. For the "American edition" of the treatise, Charles A. Lee, an
American physician and professor, took up "the task of revising the text, correcting
errors, and adapting the publication to the existing laws and institutions of" the
United States. Id. at vi. Dr. Lee identified his additions to the text by means of
brackets. See id. Unless otherwise specified, my references to this treatise are to the
additions that were written by Dr. Lee.
38. John Ordronaux, The Jurisprudence of Medicine, in its Relations to the Law
of Contracts, Torts, and Evidence, with a Supplement on the Liabilities of Vendors of
Drugs 58 (1869).
39. See De Ville, supra note 25, at 43 ("Because so many malpractice plaintiffs
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was popular in the United States, 40 asserted that "[f]rom the evidence
given on some of these occasions, it appears that an action of this kind
is occasionally
resorted to as a very convenient way of settling a long
41
account.

Medical commentators stressed that treatment decisions could be
difficult,42 and they contended that physicians should not be held
liable for reasonable errors in judgment.43 John Elwell suggested that
lawyers "may not fully realize the necessary and formidable
difficulties that the medical and surgical practitioner have to
encounter at every step, and the uncertainty of the results, even in the
hands of the most skillful and experienced. 4
Though Elwell
disclaimed any intent "to enter into a defense of the medical
profession," he urged that "the heaviest judgment of the law be visited
on those who ignorantly, drunkenly and grossly trifle with health and
human life" 45-rather than on physicians who merely made an error in
judgment.4 6
Relatedly, commentators argued that bad results should not, in and
of themselves, give rise to malpractice liability. Bathurst Woodman
and Charles Tidy, English physicians whose treatise on medical
jurisprudence was printed in the United States, stated that "[t]he
had not paid their bills, physicians began to believe that their poorer patients were the
most likely to sue."); Mohr, supra note 23, at 115 ("Many [physicians] thought that
the vast majority of malpractice suits were initiated by poor patients either trying to
escape paying for a job they considered less than perfect or trying to turn a misfortune
into cash at the expense of a wealthy professional.").
40. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 37, 198.
41. Taylor, supra note 28, at 275.
42. See, e.g., id. (asserting, with respect to malpractice suits arising from
obstetrical cases, that "much difference of opinion exists among the most eminent
practitioners of midwifery respecting the treatment to be pursued in certain cases of
difficulty").
43. A Canadian lawyer pointed out that advances in medical knowledge presented
risks for the physician:
The medical man has ofttimes to sail between Scylla and Charybdis. While,
on the one hand, he is bound to consult the attainable literature in his
profession, and to diligently gather in ... the experience of his confreresfor in determining what is negligence, the improvements that are constantly
taking place are always considered-at the same time he must not try new
modes or methods too readily ....
R. Vashon Rogers, Jr., The Law and Medical Men 71 (1884).
44. Elwell, supra note 24, at 37.
45. Id. at 47.
46. Id. at 29 ("The physician and attorney are not responsible for the errors of an
enlightened judgment, where good judgments may differ."). European commentators
made similar arguments. See, e.g., J. Briand & Ernest Chaudd, Manuel Complet de
M6decine Ldgale, ou R6sum6 des Meilleurs Ouvrages Publi6s Jusqu'a ce Jour sur
cette Matikre et des Jugements et Arr~ts les Plus R6cents, et Contenant un Trait6
tlmentaire de Chimie LUgale 46 (8th ed. 1869) ("The tribunals .... then, should not
recognize liability, either criminal or civil, unless it is well established that the doctor
acted with unforgivable thoughtlessness or carelessness, or that he showed . . . crass
ignorance .... " (author's translation)).
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result of operations is one of the issues on which an accusation of
malapraxis is often raised against medical men, in most cases unjustly,
since the result is often beyond our control. 4 7 Similarly, an American
physician writing in the late nineteenth century argued that "until
medicine becomes an exact science, in a certain proportion
of cases
48
failure must follow the efforts of the best-informed men.
3. Physician Response
Some physicians appear to have responded to the rise in
malpractice suits by changing their fields or treatment decisions;
others urged physicians, as a group, to take defensive measures.
James Webster, a professor of medical jurisprudence at a medical
school in New York, advised students in 1850 to avoid treating poor
people who had fractures.4 9 A decade later, John Elwell observed:
Civil [malpractice] suits for damages are of a frequency, alarming,
both to the profession of medicine and to the public. Suits of this
class, in some parts of the country, seem to be on the increase....
The result is, that some of the most thoroughly qualified medical
men, utterly refuse to attend surgical cases,-confining their practice
to that of medicine alone.5"
When physicians did treat fractures, some of them, for a time, may
have chosen to amputate in order to avoid the51chance that a badly
healed limb would give rise to a malpractice suit.
As the century wore on, physicians tried to discourage malpractice
suits by attempting to deter other physicians from aiding the plaintiffs.
Elwell's treatise quoted an 1856 report by a committee of the Ohio
State Medical Association that exhorted: "[W]here it is possible to
avoid it, let not a member of the profession be found in the ranks of
the prosecution."52 Ordronaux's 1869 treatise quoted the American

47. Woodman & Tidy, supra note 35, at 635.
48. George Ryerson Fowler, Surgical Malpractice,in 2 Allan McLane Hamilton &
Lawrence Godkin, A System of Legal Medicine 573, 575 (1894).
49. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 117-18.
50. Elwell, supra note 24, at 7. This problem appears to have persisted. Writing
in 1871, James O'Dea noted the frequency of malpractice suits arising from "the
treatment of fractures, amputations, and dislocations," and he asserted that "honest
and capable surgeons have seriously debated the necessity of retiring from a
profession whose emoluments are so scanty in comparison with its risks." O'Dea,
supra note 30, at 441.
51. See De Ville, supra note 25, at 101-02 ("Faced with a difficult fracture, an
unethical or unscrupulous doctor might recommend a dramatic amputation to portray
himself as a courageous surgeon and, at the same time, sidestep the prospect of an
imperfect result and possible malpractice charge.").
52. Elwell, supra note 24, at 9. Elwell himself did not think this measure would
solve the malpractice problem; rather, he argued that the only solution was to
"elevat[e] the standard of Medico-legal knowledge in the professions of Law and
Medicine." Id.
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Medical Association's code of ethics, which gave strict advice to the
doctor who took over the care of a colleague's patient:
[N]o unjust or illiberal insinuations should be thrown out in relation
to the conduct or practice previously pursued, which should be
justified as far as candor and regard for truth and probity will
permit; for it often happens that patients become dissatisfied when
they do not experience immediate relief, and, as many diseases are
naturally protracted, the want of success, in the first stage of
treatment,
affords no evidence of a lack of professional knowledge
53
and skill.

A physician speaking in 1871 made explicit the connection between
such "insinuations" and resulting litigation:
I have no doubt many lawsuits are unintentionally originated, or at
least encouraged by the indiscreet or inconsiderate judgments which
medical men are too much in the habit of passing on the conduct
and treatment of their professional confreres in presence of lay
people. It is impossible to exercise too much caution in expressing
opinions on the character of the professional services of a brother
practitioner. 54

B. Critiquesof the Litigation System
As James Mohr has documented, physicians' fears of malpractice
liability were closely related to physicians' complaints about the
system by which that liability was imposed."
Doctors argued that
53. Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association, reprinted in Ordronaux,
supra note 38, at 233, 246.
54. O'Dea, supra note 30, at 440. The English authors Woodman and Tidy made
a similar argument. Regarding dislocations, they asserted:
It is not possible, after some weeks or months, to say definitely in certain
cases whether such and such injuries have occurred, as, particularly in the
case of dislocations, all traces of the original accident may rapidly disappear.
Professional men should therefore be cautious not to judge their brethren
unfairly.
Woodman & Tidy, supra note 35, at 630. They proceeded to issue a broader warning
about testifying for malpractice plaintiffs:
It may be said, referring to malapraxis generally, that no medical man should
give an adverse opinion on the conduct or practice of a professional brother,
without having all the facts of the case before him; and whatever opinion he
may give at an inquest, or in a police court, he should be prepared to justify
before the higher tribunals, as well as before the whole medical profession.
It has happened, though we hope rarely, that a medical man in condemning
the practice of a brother professional, has only shown his own ignorance of
the progress of science in general, and of medical science in particular.
Id. at 636.
55. 1 am indebted to James Mohr's illuminating book for first alerting me to the
fact that these issues surfaced in the nineteenth century as well as in the present time.
See generally Mohr, supra note 23. Mohr provides an enlightening discussion of
nineteenth century physicians' complaints about the adversary system and such
physicians' proposals to alter that system. The issues of medical malpractice and
medical expert testimony are two of several themes that Mohr explores in his book.
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juries and judges lacked the capability to judge the merits of
malpractice cases. More broadly, doctors asserted that the United
States litigation system was incapable of making proper use of medical
expertise. Medico-legal writers condemned the adversarial nature of
American litigation, and contended that civil law systems such as
France and Germany did a much better job of incorporating medical
expertise into adjudication. Throughout the mid and late nineteenth
century, such writers proposed a number of procedural reforms
designed to address this problem. Few if any of those reforms were
implemented, however, and the momentum of the reform movement
apparently died by the turn of the century.
1. Criticisms of the Adversary Expert System
Doctors in the nineteenth century asserted a barrage of complaints
about the way in which medical expertise functioned in courts in the
United States: Standards for expert qualification were too lax; the
mode of expert testimony was unfair and permitted abuse; and juries
were incompetent to evaluate medical evidence. Doctors identified
numerous ways in which the American method of using expert
testimony harmed doctors, both individually and as a profession: The
system brought the medical community into disrepute and it could
ruin the careers of individual doctors; and, adding injury to insult, the
system often failed to compensate doctors properly for their
testimony. Several types of dispute-particularly cases involving
infanticide, insanity, or poisoning-seem to have been particularly
hazardous to the status of medical experts in the United States; but in
all areas, medical commentators asserted that the adversary mode of
litigation was a hostile format for medical experts.
Prominent physicians and medical writers believed that judges were
indiscriminate in their admission of medical expert testimony. The
lack of regulation of the medical profession in the mid-nineteenth
century meant that medical practitioners included not only regular
physicians but also followers of several alternative schools.56 This
diversity affected legal as well as medical practice, as courts decided to
admit medical testimony irrespective of the school to which the
witness belonged.57
A standard American treatise on medical
Building upon Mohr's insights, and drawing upon both sources Mohr cites and other
sources, I focus here upon physician critiques of adversarial procedures, and upon
proposals to alter those procedures.
56. See id. at 89 ("In the United States... by mid-century, medicine had become
an overtly unregulated, unlicensed, overcrowded, doctrinally incoherent, and fiercely
competitive profession.").
57. As Mohr explains:
Since there were no functional licensing laws to regulate the practice of
medicine, no formal educational requirements, and plenty of deep-seated
disagreements over what constituted effective health care, American courts
during the second quarter of the nineteenth century tended more and more
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jurisprudence declared that "[d]oubtless there is too little
discrimination exercised in receiving all who are called doctors, as
witnesses."58 A few decades later, John Ordronaux observed that
"courts will receive the opinions of physicians of any school as equally
entitled to respect, leaving
their credibility and authority to be
59
determined by the jury.
Some established physicians likely resented the fact that their
testimony was weighed against that of physicians they perceived as
less qualified. A committee writing in the early 1870s noted the
argument that it was
unjust... to compel honest and honorable experts... to put
themselves in conflict in open court upon, so far as the public saw,
terms of equality with pretenders, who were willing to lend
themselves, and the science to which they pretended, for hire, to
promote the views or interests of their employers.6 °
Courts' leniency concerning expert qualifications may also have
contributed to the cynicism of observers who suspected that parties
with weak positions shopped for an expert willing to support their
views: "Of course it is easy for a party to summon the single expert
who may happen to have propounded the bizarre theory which is
necessary to sustain such party's case."61
Though some medical writers decried the courts' willingness to
admit testimony by all manner of medical experts, it is not clear that
physicians would have welcomed more stringent court scrutiny of
expert testimony. After noting the courts' lax approach to medical
qualifications, Ordronaux remarked: "It is also a fact not to be lost
sight of, that a court may not be any more competent to decide that a
medical witness offered is not an expert, than that he is, for its
qualifications in this particular are no better than those of ordinary
laymen .... ,"6
A number of medical writers asserted that judges
often to err on the side of inclusion in medically related cases.
Id. at 100.
58. 2 Theodric Romeyn Beck & John B. Beck, Elements of Medical
Jurisprudence 697 (6th ed., Thomas, Cowperthwait, & Co. 1838) (1823); see also
Mohr, supra note 23, at 100 (discussing the same statement in earlier edition). This
critique occurs in a paragraph discussing English judicial practices, as part of a general
discussion of medical evidence. See 2 Beck & Beck, supra, at 697. The critique's
application closer to home would likely have struck readers in the United States.
59. Ordronaux, supra note 38, at 137; see also W.J. Conklin, The Medical Expert, 3
Ohio Med. & Surgical J. 127, 134 (1878). "[T]he courts, under the present system of
receiving experts' testimony, have no means of judging of the qualifications of a
particular witness. His deportment upon the witness stand, and the reasons which he
assigns for his opinions, only go to affect his credibility, not the question of
admissibility." Id.
60. Expert Testimony, 9 Alb. L.J. 193,193 (1874).
61. George W. Field, Field's Medico-Legal Guide for Doctors and Lawyers 13
(1887).
62. Ordronaux, supra note 38, at 137.
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lacked the knowledge necessary to assess expert qualifications and
testimony.63 A book review in an 1826 issue of the New York Medical
and Physical Journal noted that "[j]udges have sometimes a most
delicate part to act, viz.-to discriminate between the knowledge and
acquirements of various medical witnesses."'
The author suggested
that though "[]udges ...sometimes fancy their knowledge of medical
matters very profound," the65 judges' assessments of medical testimony
were frequently erroneous.
Physicians who testified in court proceedings often hated the
experience.66 Doctors disliked the trial format because the use of oral
rather than written testimony could require them to give opinions
based on facts they had not yet had adequate time to consider. T.R.
Beck explained:
That class of witnesses who are called upon to give opinions on a
certain statement of facts, have generally been unable to examine it
before the trial. They often hear it imperfectly, sometimes
confusedly, and at all events.., they have but a few moments to
67
reflect on its various import ....
Doctors resented even more strongly the mode of examinationespecially the rough treatment they experienced during some crossexaminations6--and the habit of some counsel of disparaging
opposing witnesses.69 As early as 1826, a writer in a medical journal
63. The view that lay people lacked the capacity to judge medical questions also
underlay the proposal that coroners should have medical training. The American
editor of Guy's treatise on forensic medicine asked: "Suppose an ignorant coroner be
summoned to hold an inquest in case of death from mal-practice, such as
Thompsonian, or Homceopathic? Where is the knowledge which is to guide him to a
safe decision, and interpose the shield of law and justice to the progress of ignorance
and charlatanry?" Guy, supra note 37, at 7.
64. 5 N.Y. Med. & Physical J. 597, 607 (1826) (reviewing Letter to the Hon. Isaac
Parker, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts ("containing
Remarks on the Dislocation of the Hip-joint, occasioned by the publication of a Trial,
which took place at Machias, in the State of Maine, June 1824")) [hereinafter
Review].
65. Id.
66. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 197.
67. T. Romeyn Beck, Annual Address Delivered Before the Medical Society of the
State of New-York, Feb. 6, 1828, 7 N.Y. Med. & Physical J.9, 25 (1828); see also
Elwell, supra note 24, at 307 ("The facts upon which the medical witness may
suddenly be called to give an opinion may be new to him... [and] there may be no
time for much reflection, or for a reference to authority."). James Mohr provides an
insightful discussion of Beck's 1828 address. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 95-99.
68. James Mohr points out: "Physicians... were testifying in an adversarial
setting, where rebuttal and contradiction were considered normal, even essential.
What lawyers viewed as a positive good, physicians took as unprofessional bullying."
Mohr, supra note 23, at 98.
69. In 1885 Henry Campbell, who at the time was President of the American
Medical Association, gave an example of the sort of insinuations that medical
witnesses found so galling. He described a poisoning case in which the defense
attorney did not attempt to cross-examine the prosecution's expert on the substance
of his testimony; rather, defense counsel used his cross-examination to establish that
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complained that "there is scarcely a case, that we have seen reported
for many years, in which a great freedom of speech is not permitted
concerning the talents and medical standing of individuals."7 Two
decades later, an American physician complained of lawyers'
"insolent and abusive treatment" of medical witnesses in criminal
cases; he asserted that some lawyers were "in the habit of
endeavouring to carry their point, by brow-beating and confusing the
witnesses, and involving them in absurdities and contradictions."71
Even if lawyers were not abusive, medical writers warned that they
could be manipulative: Isaac Ray, in his treatise on insanity, warned
that lawyers "frame their questions so as to bring out the wished for
reply."7"
In addition, doctors complained that some lawyers lacked the
technical knowledge necessary to elicit testimony on the relevant
medical issues. Samuel Gross, then the President of the American
Medical Association, asserted in 1868:
My experience is that there are few lawyers.., who are fully
competent to elicit even the more prominent facts of a case. Often,
indeed, from an anxious desire to do all they can for the defence of
their clients, they do not hesitate to browbeat and bully the medical
witness, especially if he is young and timid, in order to distort his
testimony, and to confuse the minds of the judge and jury.
Sometimes, again, even when influenced by the best and most
laudable intentions, the lawyer, from sheer ignorance, propounds his
a manner as
interrogations in so awkward and unscientific
73
effectually to defeat the very end he has in view.
Once the expert testimony was given at trial, there was the further
question whether the jury was competent to evaluate it. Many
medical commentators were pessimistic on this point. Isaac Ray,
writing in 1838 of medical testimony on insanity, asserted that "the
jury is seldom a proper tribunal for distinguishing the true from the
false, and fixing on each its rightful value. '74 The problem appears to
in all the cases in which the prosecution's expert had tested for arsenic, he had found
it. Defense counsel then argued to the jury, with respect to the expert: "'[Hie is the
arsenic hunter and arsenic finder for his college, and, you see, he is a good one; he
always finds the arsenic."' The jury acquitted. Campbell, supra note 28, at 482-83.
70. Review, supra note 64, at 606. At approximately the same time, two noted
English authors suggested the existence of similar problems in England. See 1 J.A.
Paris & J.S.M. Fonblanque, Medical Jurisprudence 153 (1823) ("[Wle do not mean to
arraign the present forms of examination in general, when we assert that some abuse
in practice too frequently places the [medical] witness in as painful a situation, as if he
were himself a criminal.").
71. Guy, supra note 37, at 5.
72. I. Ray, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity 567 (4th ed. 1860).
73. Address of Samuel D. Gross, M.D., LL.D., President of the Association, in 19
Transactions of the Am. Med. Ass'n 57, 62 (1868) [hereinafter Gross]; see also Mohr,
supra note 23, at 53-54 (discussing Gross's interest in medical jurisprudence and
mentioning Gross's 1868 address).
74. I. Ray, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity 59 (1838).
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have been acute in cases involving questions of mental health. The
author of an 1893 treatise on insanity asserted:
One great evil is that there are some men who, because they have a
little actual knowledge on some specialty, claim credit for a great
deal which they do not possess, and rush to the witness stand to
assume a duty for which they are entirely incompetent, and, in their
character of experts, their opinions
may have the same weight with
75
the jury as those of better men.
In the 1870s, a committee appointed to report to the Massachusetts
legislature concerning expert testimony questioned the competence of
"jurors drawn from the various walks and pursuits of life, untrained
and uninformed on the matters upon which they are called to judge,"
and noted "the haphazard result to which they might come in trying to
'76
distinguish between what was true and false in science.
It seems likely that doctors' mistrust of juries contributed to their
fears of malpractice suits, by giving the impression that justice was
random. What two British authors asserted in 1882 concerning
criminal malpractice charges in England may well have resonated with
American physicians with respect to civil suits:
The majority of our judges are inclined to make every allowance for
the difficulties imposed by the responsible duties of medical men. It
must be confessed, however, that both at their hands, and more
particularly at the hands of juries, the most arrant quacks, whose
practice was little better than a long series of murders, have often
met with more protection
when arraigned on criminal charges than
77
registered practitioners.
Medical commentators were not concerned only with the outcomes
of such suits, however; they also were troubled by the effects such
litigation had on the way in which the public and the courts perceived
the medical profession. Errors and incompetence on the part of some
medical witnesses led to distrust of the profession as a whole.78 Some
duties of the medical witness required expertise that general
practitioners normally lacked. T.R. Beck argued in 1828 that post75. Edward C. Mann, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity xviiixix (1893).
76. Expert Testimony, supra note 60, at 193.
77. Woodman & Tidy, supra note 35, at 627.
78. Such problems were not unique to the United States. Discussing medical
evidence in criminal cases, Paris and Fonblanque noted in 1823 that in
several of the more interesting trials,.., the medical witness has evinced any
thing rather than a well grounded acquaintance with the philosophical
bearings of the question; and while he has endeavoured to conceal his
ignorance under the veil of technical phraseology, he has artfully sought to
shun the embarrassments it might create by a display of bold and sweeping
assertions, alike hostile to the discovery of truth, and the administration of
justice.
Paris & Fonblanque, supra note 70, at 400.
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mortems required a knowledge of anatomy and chemistry beyond that
possessed by many practicing doctors.7 9 Likewise, Isaac Ray argued
that expert testimony on insanity should only be given by specialists.8"
He conceded that "in important cases, the testimony of one or more
of this class is generally given," but he asserted that "it may be
contradicted by that of others utterly guiltless of any knowledge of the
subject, on which they tender their opinions with arrogant
confidence."'" John Elwell expressed strong views on incompetent
experts:
[T]he "doctors" who often intrude themselves upon the court and
bar, as the representatives of the medical profession, do, by their
ignorance, self-conceit, and disgusting assurance and complacency,
present so perfect an embodiment of egotism and imbecility, that
every man of common sense is at once disgusted ...; and the worthy
members of a noble profession have to bear unjustly, the odium and
reproach thus wrongfully incurred ....
82
A few years later, a committee of the American Medical
Association opined that "there is no cause which has done more to
lessen the confidence of the community in the medical profession than
the manner in which physicians often give testimony before our
courts."83
Apart from the quality of the testimony, the mere fact that experts
often seemed to disagree with one another was seen by some to
diminish the authority of the medical community as a whole.
Commentators suggested that disagreement among medical witnesses
indicated a lack of competence on the part of at least one of the
witnesses. The Becks' treatise asserted: "It is evident that the
difference of opinion originates, in most cases, from a want of
knowledge in one or the other [witness]. 84
Even if disagreement did not betoken lack of knowledge, it was
seen to diminish the credence lay people gave to medical testimony.
An 1845 treatise quoted Taylor's remark, concerning deaths after
79. See Beck, supra note 67, at 13-14.
80. Ray, supra note 74, at 58-59. Ordronaux agreed. See Ordronaux, supra note
38, at 164 ("The majority [of physicians are] ...wholly inexperienced in insanity, and
as such, incompetent to testify as experts in controversies upon this issue.").
81. Ray, supra note 74, at 59.
82. Elwell, supra note 24, at 300.
83. Report on Recommendations and Suggestions Contained in President's
Address, 19 Transactions of the Am. Med. Ass'n 75, 77-78 (1868) [hereinafter Report].
84. 2 Beck & Beck, supra note 58, at 695. The English commentator Alfred
Taylor offered a similar view concerning testimony on wounds: "A difference of
opinion will often exist among medical witnesses as to whether a particular wound
was or was not dangerous to life. Unanimity can only be expected when the judgment
and experience of the witnesses are equal." Taylor, supra note 28, at 186.
85. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 198 (noting that "the process of eliciting medical
evidence [made] physicians look scientifically weak, internally divided, and
dangerously unprofessional").
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operations, that "[d]ifferences of opinion upon these subjects among
eminent members of the profession, too justly convey to the public the
impression that there are no fixed principles upon which medical
opinions are based; and, consequently, that it would be dangerous to
act upon them."86 A medical professor who addressed a county
medical society in 1878 posed the question, "Why has expert
testimony fallen into such universal disrepute?"8 7 In answering his
own question, he asserted that "[t]he conflict of opinion" among
experts in prominent trials "has done much to bring about this
result."8 A treatise co-authored in the 1890s by a physician and a
lawyer asserted that contradictory testimony "must of necessity cast
doubt either upon the reliability of medical opinion, or else upon the
standing of medicine as an exact science."'8 9
Critics also charged that the United States system contributed to
partisan bias among medical experts.9' T.R. Beck gave a sympathetic
explanation of this in his 1828 address to the New York State Medical
Society:
[T]he medical witness is often placed in a delicate situation from the
circumstances under which he is summoned. He is a witness for one
or other party... ; and he is so summoned, in the belief that his
evidence will favour the side by which he is produced. It would be
desirable, that at least the person who has made the previous
examination before the coroner's jury, should be divested of this, so
far as to enable him to give a full and fair statement of all the
circumstances that make for either side. I am aware that he can now
do so, and indeed his oath obliges him to it.... But often the
technicalities of an examination, and particularly by an adverse
counsel, overcome that self-possession which is so essential. Pressed
by perplexing questions and probably irritated in his feelings, he is
apt to make declarations more strongly corroborative of opinions
that he has formerly advanced, and as his examination advances, he
may incur the charge of being biassed, more than facts will warrant.9'
Though commentators may have been sympathetic to the plight of
86. Guy, supra note 37, at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Conklin, supra note 59, at 128.
88. Id. at 128-29.
89. 1 Hamilton & Godkin, supra note 48, at 23.
90. Similar issues arose in the English system. Guy's 1845 treatise warned:
Medical men are sometimes called on to give evidence for the prosecution,
at other times for the defence. In such cases there is great necessity for
caution; and it is obvious that no medical man can be justified in consenting
to appear for either party, until, having heard all the facts on which his
opinion must be formed, he can conscientiously give evidence in favour of
the party for whom he is retained.
Guy, supra note 37, at 10. (Unlike my other quotations from this treatise, this passage
is one from the English edition, rather than an addition by the treatise's American
editor.)
91. Beck, supra note 67, at 24 (citations omitted); see also Mohr, supra note 23, at
98 (discussing a portion of this passage).
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the medical witness, they were deeply critical of the partisan role in
which the system cast him. An 1845 treatise quoted with apparent
approval Taylor's complaint that:
we are accustomed to hear of a medical prosecution and a medical
defence, as if the whole duty of a medical jurist consisted in his
making the best of a case, on the side for which he happens to be
engaged, adopting the legal rule of suppressing those points which
are against him,
and92giving an undue prominence to others which
favour.
his
in
be
may
To guard against such problems, another American physician
cautioned the medical witness to "use every effort to prevent his
feelings from becoming so interested as to control his judgment, or
warp his opinion."9 3
Even if physicians heeded this advice, the adversarial nature of the
proceedings may have cut against their efforts. In Samuel Gross's
view:
The procedure, as generally conducted, partakes much more of the
character of a combat, in which the opposing parties are pitted
against each other, often with a degree of fierceness and acrimony
that only shows too clearly the partisan feelings of the belligerents,
instead of the dignified inquiry into the real merits of the case. The
result is that, instead of enlightening the court and jury by their
testimony, the medical witnesses only embarrass their minds, and
this especially defeats the ends of justice.94
In addition, some experts apparently worsened the situation by
attacking the credentials of opposing witnesses. T.R. Beck warned his
audience in 1828 that "medical witnesses [should] treat[] each other
with respect.... If they do not.. . , others will with pleasure aid in
the work of depreciation."95
Such problems did not simply tarnish the profession as a whole;
they could also prove very harmful to the witnesses themselves. 96 A
Boston doctor addressing the Massachusetts Medical Society in 1851
asserted that opposing counsel "not unfrequently, in the summing-up
92. Guy, supra note 37, at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. David Humphreys Storer, Medical Jurisprudence,3 Med. Comm. Mass. Med.
Soc'y 131,140 (1851).
94. Gross, supra note 73, at 61.
95. Beck, supra note 67, at 26; see also Mohr, supra note 23, at 99 (discussing this
passage). If a physician could show that a medical witness had maliciously impugned
his competence, he might be able to recover damages for libel, despite the privilege
that normally attached to testimony in court. See White v. Carroll, 42 N.Y. 161, 164-67
(1870). A jury awarded White, a homceopathic physician, $100 in damages against
Carroll, an allopathic physician, because Carroll had testified that White was "a
quack" and had asserted, on the witness stand, that "I would not call him a
physician." Id. at 165.
96. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 197-98 (observing that "physicians risked their
personal reputations each time they took the witness stand as an expert").
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of the evidence and in his argument, by intimating his doubts of the
credibility or competency of the medical witness, inflicts a lasting
injury upon his professional character."97 Though John Elwell seemed
to take a less pessimistic view of the process, he too noted the impact
the courtroom experience would have on the witness. Based on his
performance on the witness stand, Elwell predicted, "The physician's
influence will be either much stronger than before, or it will be
annihilated. While ignorance and deception... may be triumphant in
the sick room without being called to account or cross-examined, in
open court they.., will most certainly be exposed."98
The unpleasant features of expert testimony were all the more
repugnant to physicians because of the frequent lack of payment. For
much of the nineteenth century, physicians were required to testify
without compensation for the value of their time.99 Medico-legal
authors often spent several pages discussing the physician's claim to
fair compensation. 0
2. Proposals for Reform
Nineteenth century proposals for altering the use of expert medical
testimony arose both from observers' dissatisfaction with the current
American system and from their awareness that France and Germany
handled matters quite differently. Some proposals retained the notion
of in-court expert testimony, but would alter the way in which experts
were selected, prepared or examined. Other schemes entailed the
submission of medical questions to panels of medical experts. Each
suggestion addressed, in some way, the perceived problems with the
adversarial model of expert evidence.
As James Mohr has documented, reform-minded physicians in
nineteenth century America drew heavily upon ideas they found in
French and, later, German medico-legal jurisprudence. 10 1 As Mohr
writes:
[T]he French permitted judges to call experts on behalf of the court
to help settle difficult or disputed questions of a medical nature.
Once the expert had ruled... , that ruling had a de facto
presumption of truth. Disgruntled parties to the case could attack
the ruling, but the burden of proof, because they had a vested
97. Storer, supra note 93, at 137; see also Mohr, supra note 23, at 103-04
(discussing Storer's address and his prior career).
98. Elwell, supra note 24, at 296.
99. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 90-92, 199-200.
100. See, e.g., Elwell, supra note 24, at 581; Marshall D. Ewell, A Manual of
Medical Jurisprudence for the Use of Students at Law and of Medicine 9-15 (1887);
Guy, supra note 37, at 5; Ordronaux, supra note 38, at 249-50; Henry Wade Rogers,
The Law of Expert Testimony 254-64 (1883); Beck, supra note 67, at 30-31.
101. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 12-13, 42, 48-51 (discussing French influence); id.
at 231-32 (discussing German influence). T.R. Beck, for example, wrote approvingly
of Foderd's treatise on medical jurisprudence. Id. at 17.
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interest, was on them. Even though the French system had evolved
from fundamentally inquisitorial origins, most American champions
of better medical jurisprudence considered it superior in medicolegal matters to the adversarial system they had inherited from the
English... .102

Well-read American observers would also have noticed that the
German system of expert opinion operated differently. 3 A treatise
on forensic medicine by the German physician Johann Casper boasted
that Germany "possess[ed] a body of medical men expressly
appointed.., to carry out ...all medico-legal (and sanitary police)
duties.""
Casper noted that though France used court-appointed
experts, the choice of the experts was in most parts of France left up
to the court.1 15 Casper argued that the German system was preferable,
for especially in criminal processes the medical authorities first
called are legally only those whom the State has assigned to the
judicial courts after previously ascertaining their knowledge in this
department, while there is also an organised series of courts of
professional experts, to whose judgment the opinion given by the
medical men first employed may be referred.0 6

102. Mohr, supra note 23, at 50-51. An observer of the French system might have
noted, however, that French medical commentators expressed some dissatisfaction
with the treatment of expert testimony. See, e.g., 2 Foderd, supra note 26, at 227-28
(discussing medical testimony on survival and order of death) ("It is quite true that
often the men of the law pay too much attention to doctors, and that often they don't
pay enough attention to them .... " (author's translation)). Mohr observes that the
French approach to expert opinions
did not work as well as its American admirers believed it did. The French
system was open to influence-peddling and corruption; sanction was often
given to the opinions of physicians who did not merit the confidence of the
courts ... ; and the structure was constantly in need of tinkering and reform
throughout the century.
Mohr, supra note 23, at 51.
103. Thus, for example, Henry Wade Rogers' 1883 treatise on expert testimony
discussed Casper's description of the German expert system. See Rogers, supra note
100, at 56.
104. 3 Casper, supra note 36, at 178 (1864).
105. See id. at 178-79. French commentators shared some of Casper's concerns.

Briand and Chaudd noted that good practitioners did not necessarily make good
experts, and discussed the need for training and selection of men in each locale to be
medical experts. See Briand & Chaud6, supra note 46, at 20.
106. 3 Casper, supra note 36, at 179 (1864). However, Casper noted with
disapproval a trend toward calling other, nonofficial, experts to testify "either along
with the official physician or to his complete exclusion." Id. at 181.
The first volume of Casper's work gave more detail on the system for
reporting the results of autopsies. Autopsy reports went through two rounds of
review and revision-first by referees at a provincial medical college and then by
referees at a centralized scientific commission. See 1 Casper, supra note 36, at 233-34
(1861). However, written reports were generally not admissible at trial, and it was
seen as impracticable for a reviewing expert to appear to testify live. See id. at 234-35.
Instead, a local physician could be "required to defend the [opinion] viva voce at the
trial." Id. at 235. Casper complained that juries were not bound by the reports and
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Perhaps inspired by continental examples, some American
commentators suggested that states should permanently appoint
expert medical witnesses. For example, an 1826 book review in a New
York medical journal decried the treatment of a medical witness in a
recent malpractice trial, and proposed the following "remedy":
Let a set of men be particularly educated as examiners in medical
cases-and, of course, as witnesses. The facts will thus be settled;
and their qualifications will give force to their opinions. If any are
disposed to question these, the grounds for discussion are laid out,
and the differences can be understood. In this way, also, these
examiners become vested with a sort of 10legal
function, which may
7
occasionally serve to enlighten the bench.
Similarly, having noted the difficulties arising from expert testimony
on insanity in the United States, Isaac Ray suggested:
[I]t would be far better, if we had a class of men, more or less like
that of the experts of the French, peculiarly fitted for the duty by a
course of studies expressly directed to this end. They might be
appointed by the government, in numbers adapted to the wants and
circumstances of the population, and should be always ready at the
call of courts, to examine the health ofl0 criminals,
draw up reports
8
touching the same, and deliver opinions.
A narrower application of this notion was the argument that the
state should appoint physicians to serve as medical examiners. In
1828, noting that "cases of violent death.., are the most important, as
well as the most common, in which professional witnesses are
summoned," ' 9 T.R. Beck urged the adoption of the practice "of
several continental countries": "the appointment of medical men in a
county, a district, or a part of the state, who shall be specially charged
with th[e] duty" of examining bodies." 0 Such an arrangement, Beck
argued, "would in a great degree, prevent that disputation about facts,
which produces so many unpleasant collisions in courts of justice."''
Other commentators, though not proposing a permanent
"often enough" reached verdicts "most remarkably and diametrically opposed to the
medical opinion of the case." Id. at 234.
107. Review, supra note 64, at 607; see also Mohr, supra note 23, at 84 (quoting part
of this passage).
108. Ray, supra note 74, at 60 (citation omitted).
109. Beck, supra note 67, at 11.
110. Id. at 14; see also Mohr, supra note 23, at 84-87 (quoting this passage and the
passage cited in note 111, infra, and discussing Beck's proposal for "[s]tate-supported
medical jurisprudence").
111. Beck, supra note 67, at 15. John Beck, T.R. Beck's brother, took a similar
view. In the chapter on infanticide that he contributed to his brother's treatise, John
Beck detailed a number of expert reports from French cases, and explained: "I have
selected them not merely with the view of illustrating the doctrines previously
advanced, but of showing the manner in which criminal cases are investigated and
reported upon, on the continent of Europe. It is to be hoped that a similar mode may
ere long, be adopted in this country." 1 Beck & Beck, supra note 58, at 439.
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appointment, argued that the expert witnesses for a particular case
should be chosen and examined by the court. John Ordronaux,
writing in 1869, asserted that if experts were chosen by the court, "and
if their examination in chief could be restricted to the court solely,
they would be placed above the reach of any possible assumption of
bias towards either party.""' 2 He observed that such a practice "isin
fact largely adopted in the courts of continental Europe, where the
expert is treated more as an amicus curiae than he is under our
'
common law jurisdiction."1 13
The concern over the partisan nature of expert testimony also led
some to propose that if experts were to be retained by the parties, the
experts should at least make an effort to see both sides of the dispute.
The Becks' treatise advised:
The [medical] witness is not retained for one party; he does not
testify for or against one or the other party ....A good plan... is
to talk not exclusively with the lawyer or the witnesses on one side,4
but hold, if possible, free intercourse with those of the other party."1
The treatise recognized, however, that consultation between opposing
experts was unlikely to occur: "Much [disagreement between experts]
could doubtless be avoided if the medical witnesses on either part
could meet and consult together; as this is not ordinarily possible, the
differences will remain, and each witness must make his evidence as
strong as possible."' 15
Another suggested approach was to assist the judge in managing the
expert testimony. Samuel Gross proposed the appointment "in every
judicial district" of an officer "to aid in the examination of witnesses
in every trial involving scientific testimony.""' 6 This officer would be
appointed by the state's highest court, would receive a salary from the
government, and would be free of "partisan feeling and personal

112. Ordronaux, supra note 38, at 163. Likewise, a physician speaking in 1871
argued that expert witnesses should be better educated, as European experts were,
that they should be less partisan, and that "the court alone should call and examine
the medical experts." O'Dea, supra note 30, at 422-23, 428-29.
113. Ordronaux, supra note 38, at 190.
114. 2 Beck & Beck, supra note 58, at 963 (C.R. Gilman rev., 11th ed., J.B.
Pippincott & Co. 1860) (1823).
115. Id. at 970-71. Hamilton and Godkin, writing in 1894, took a stronger position:
They suggested that physicians should "refuse to testify unless before doing so they
can meet in conference with the expert witnesses to be called on the other side of the
case, and have an interchange of views." Hamilton & Godkin, supra note 89, at 24.
116. Gross, supra note 73, at 62. The American Medical Association committee
appointed to consider Gross's proposal reported favorably on it. See Report, supra
note 83, at 78 (stating that under current circumstances, "we know of no remedy to
meet the case except by the adoption of the plan recommended by our President").
In his discussion of the AMA, James Mohr quotes and discusses Gross's proposal, and
the committee's response. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 227.
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bias.""' 7 One of his major functions would be to restrain the
adversarial excesses of the parties at trial:
It should be made part of his duty to prevent the bar from
embarrassing the medical witness-a practice at the present day
disgracefully common among lawyers-and to assist them in
explaining themselves fully upon every interrogatory that may be
propounded; to prompt the advocates in regard to any questions of
omission, tending to supply additional information; in a word, to act
as a medium between the opposing counsel, and as a light to the
judge and jury, in clearing up points of an obscure or doubtful
nature. 18
As this passage suggests, Gross also envisioned that the officer
would clarify and comment on the testimony of the parties' medical
experts:
He should have the privilege of summing up the medical testimony,
not orally but in writing, for the benefit of the judge and jury, the
latter of whom are always ignorant of the meaning of technical
terms, and therefore incapable of drawing a proper distinction
between119the points of difference on the part of the scientific
witness.
While Gross's proposal would have assigned a fair amount of
influence to the expert officer, other schemes would explicitly have
entrusted panels of experts with the responsibility of opining on, and
in some proposals even deciding, medical questions.12 ° An 1845
treatise quoted Taylor's suggestion that the remedy for experts'
tendency to disagree over the cause of post-operative deaths was to
"appoint[] a medical board of competent persons, to whom such
Likewise, an unsigned piece in an
questions might be referred."''
1874 issue of the Albany Law Journal argued that courts had done a
poor job policing the qualifications of experts, and suggested
submitting scientific questions to a panel of experts, "one to be
selected by each party litigant, and the third by the court,.., their

117. Gross, supra note 73, at 62-63.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 63. A letter to the Albany Law Journal in 1874 made a similar proposal:
"Why not authorize the court to associate with itself an expert, who, jointly with the
judge, would preside at the trial, direct and control the examination of the witnesses,
and sum up at the close, before the summing up by the law judge?" C. Goepp, Letter
to the Editor, Experts in Judicial Proceedings,9 Alb. L.J. 146, 146-47 (1874), cited in
Mohr, supra note 23, at 202.
120. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 115 (discussing an 1860 proposal for "medical
juries to try malpractice accusations").
121. Guy, supra note 37, at 474. Taylor made a similar proposal with respect to
malpractice proceedings: "There is often great injustice in these proceedings, and the
mischief can only be remedied by referring the facts to a medical tribunal, which
alone should be competent to decide whether or not unskillfulness had really been
shown in the management of a case." Taylor, supra note 28, at 320.
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opinion22to be received by the jury as conclusive of the issue tried by
them."'

Expert panels seem to have struck observers as a particularly
attractive method for determining questions of insanity.2 3 Elwell, in
his treatise, quoted an author who advocated referral of insanity pleas
"to a board of twelve or more competent men," rather than
permitting decision by a jury on the basis of testimony by "those
members of the profession whom the prisoner or his friends may
select, for their known support of his case., 124 Similarly,
Isaac Ray
1 25
proposed the use of a commission to determine insanity.
3. Counter-arguments
Despite the strong support among some nineteenth century
physicians for changing the way in which the legal system used expert
testimony, a number of commentators saw the proposals described
above as problematic, while others questioned their necessity.
Not all observers believed the adversary system was an evil. 26
Allen Thurman, a former Chief Justice of Ohio's highest court,
delivered a medical school commencement address in 1857 in which27
he took issue with the critiques of the American litigation system.1
He noted critics' assertions "that our courts, as constituted, and
especially our juries, are wholly incompetent to the decision of such
questions; that in order to their correct determination the triers should
be men versed in the medical art; and that from none others can a true
verdict be certainly anticipated. ' 128 Thurman admitted that juries
could err, and that "a jury of physicians" might "be more likely to
decide a medical question correctly. 1 29 Thurman argued, however,
that "[i]f medical questions should be tried by medical men alone,
upon the same principle, mercantile questions should be tried by
122. Expert Testimony in JudicialProceedings, 9 Alb. L.J. 122, 122 (1874); see also
Mohr, supra note 23, at 202 (citing this source).
123. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 173-74 (discussing proposals for "lunacy
commissions").
124. Elwell, supra note 24, at 423 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. See Ray, supra note 74, at 64. Ray maintained that this approach would be far
superior to "summoning medical witnesses to the trial-most of whom have but very
imperfect notions of the disease, and probably have not had the least communication
with the accused,-and forcing out their evidence, amid the embarrassment produced
by the queries of ingenious counsel." Id. at 63.
126. Charles Tidy, an English surgeon whose medico-legal treatise was published in
the United States, avoided the question "[w]hether an unscientific tribunal is capable,
or should be required to decide scientific differences," but argued that so long as
capable lawyers cross-examine honest experts, "no better way.., could possibly be
devised to arrive at the truth." 1 Charles Meymott Tidy, Legal Medicine 14-15 (1882).
127. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 106-08 (discussing Thurman's address).
128. Hon. A. G. Thurman, Annual Address, Delivered at Commencement of
StarlingMedical College, March 3, 1857, 9 Ohio Med. & Surgical J. 347,354 (1857).
129. Id.
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merchants, financial questions by bankers,.., and so on."13 Not only
would this be "wholly impracticable," but a jury of physicians also
would be open to the charge of bias arising either from "esprit du
corps [sic]" or from "rivalry or envy. "131 Moreover, Thurman argued
that the trier of fact should not "decide upon its own individual
knowledge"; if it did so, "[t]he case would, in effect, be tried upon ex
parte testimony, mainly, and even that undisclosed except to the
A "thorough and public investigation," Thurman
triers. ' ' 132
' 33
maintained, "takes place only upon the proper trial of a cause.'
Thurman asserted that "the danger of wrong verdicts is much less than
is generally supposed; and when we remember that the court has the
power of setting them aside, I think we may rest secure that, except in
rare instances that human foresight can hardly guard against,
substantial justice will be done."'3 4
Henry Wade Rogers, in his 1883 treatise on expert testimony, took
a similarly cautious view of the proposed reforms. He noted that
emulating "the German system of governmental experts" could have
In
some advantages, but he also noted potential problems.1 35
particular, Rogers pointed out that experts in one aspect of medicine
"often have but a superficial knowledge of other branches"; 36 thus,
if all questions of medical science.., have to be referred to a board
of governmental experts, suitors would be practically prohibited
from availing themselves of the testimony of other experts, who
might be much better qualified by their special knowledge on that
particular subject, to form a correct and accurate opinion.
Rogers also disagreed with the proposal to have the court, rather
than counsel, examine expert witnesses:
[I]t is necessary to a thorough and enlightened examination of an
expert witness on an intricate question of medical, or other science,
that the examiner should have made himself as familiar as possible
with the subject matter of inquiry.... This the court cannot do,
both for want of time, and for want of knowledge of the questions
which will be raised. It is the part of wisdom that the inquisitorial
38
and judicial functions should be so far as possible kept distinct.
Though Thurman and Rogers were both lawyers by training, some
physicians were also wary of the proposed reforms. Edward Mann,
130. Id. Mohr gives particular attention to the passages quoted in the text
accompanying notes 130-34. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 107.
131. Thurman, supra note 128, at 354.
132. Id. at 354-55.
133. Id. at 355.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Rogers, supra note 100, at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
Id.
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the author of an 1893 treatise on insanity, observed that though "[t]he
present system of calling expert witnesses may have some evils," he
doubted whether "any other system that can be suggested would not
have equally great disadvantages attending it. It would be a measure
of doubtful propriety to inaugurate any system that would obviate the
necessity or do away with the right of cross-examination in open court
in the presence of the jury.""'9 Similarly, S.V. Clevenger, writing in
1898, noted proposals for government-selected experts, but argued
that "neither politicians nor the judiciary" were well qualified to judge
experts' qualifications. 4 0 He implicitly rejected the argument that the
United States should adopt the expert procedures used in civil law
countries, noting that "[c]onditions in one country might make
practicable what would fail miserably if attempted in another."''
4. The Dwindling Impetus for Reform
In the end, the nineteenth century passed without much action on
the proposed procedural reforms. New York instituted a "lunacy
commission" to opine on questions of insanity in criminal cases, but
the commission met with criticism. 4 2 States began to appoint medical
examiners, thus providing a set of specialists to perform autopsies and
testify about them, while at the same time removing the need to
compel physicians to render unpaid testimony in court. 143 However,
little else came of the proposals.
As James Mohr explains,
More than a century of pressing for some modified version of
Continental-style medical jurisprudence in the United States finally
came to naught by the end of the nineteenth century. Physicians
thereafter largely abandoned their collective efforts to persuade the
state to create a system of official medico-legal experts, and instead
adjusted their professional responses to the circumstances that
actually prevailed.... '"

139. Mann, supra note 75, at xix.
140. 1 S.V. Clevenger, Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, or Forensic Psychiatry
108 (1898).
141. Id.
142. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 174-75, 178-79. Mohr notes that the New York
innovation "was [not] as radical a departure as it appeared to be," because
[t]he commission law authorized the experts to make a determination in
criminal cases only when the defendant made no other plea than insanity.
Moreover, if the defense disagreed with the commission's ruling, the
defendant could demand a regular jury trial to redetermine his or her status
in the normal fashion.
Id. at 174.
143. See Mohr, supra note 23, at 215-18.
144. Mohr, supra note 23, at 252.
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C. ProfessionalCoordinationand Control
To the extent that the momentum of medico-legal reform efforts
declined at the turn of the century,14 5 this decline should be viewed, as
Mohr suggests, in light of other trends in medical practice.
Developments were afoot that dampened the impact of malpractice
In particular, the increasing
suits on the medical profession.
availability to doctors of malpractice insurance and the decreasing
availability to plaintiffs of medical expert witnesses both seem to have
helped to insulate doctors, for a time, from the threat of liability.
In the mid-nineteenth century, a malpractice suit could have a
considerable financial impact on the defendant. Not only could
damages awards be substantial, but the costs of litigation could be
difficult to meet as well.146 In the 1880s, physicians began to explore in
earnest the possibility of organizing in groups to provide for the
defense of lawsuits against group members.147 Neal Hogan has
described state medical societies' adoption, in the early 1900s, of
programs which defended, but did not indemnify, participating
physicians.14 8 One apparent reason for the societies' refusal to
indemnify was that they wanted to minimize the possibility that a
successful plaintiff would actually collect on a judgment. 49 Physicians,
however, wanted not just defense but also protection against liability,
and eventually the medical societies responded by providing insurance
for their members.15 °
At the same time, the profession was changing in ways that
increased the medical community's ability to control its members.
Paul Starr has described several developments that contributed to this
change. States, with physician support, enacted licensing regulations.
151 The American Medical Association and state and local medical
societies developed interconnections and extended their authority. 52
Changes in medical education "increased the homogeneity and
cohesiveness of the profession." '5 3 Medicine's contributions to public
health heightened the profession's social influence. 54 These trends
"reflected a movement toward the strengthening of professional status
145. Even if active reform efforts petered out by the turn of the century,
commentators continued to discuss reform proposals through the early twentieth
century. See Neal C. Hogan, Unhealed Wounds: Medical Malpractice in the
Twentieth Century 80-86 (2003) (discussing commentary on medical expert witnesses
and proposals for "a commission of doctors which the courts could refer to for
expertise in medical matters").
146. See De Ville, supra note 25, at 189-90.
147. See id. at 204-05.
148. See Hogan, supra note 145, at 34-37.
149. See id. at 35.
150. See id. at 39, 45.
151. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 102 (1982).
152. See id. at 109-10.
153. Id. at 123.
154. See id. at 134-40.
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' and the growth of
and the consolidation of professional authority,"155
that authority gave the medical profession increasing influence over
individual physicians.
Greater control over members of the profession brought a greater
ability to protect those members from malpractice liability. The
"locality rule" in malpractice doctrine required the malpractice
plaintiff to obtain an expert witness from the same geographic area as
the defendant.156 As Starr observed, "[b]y adopting the 'locality rule,'
the courts prepared the way for granting considerable power to the
local medical society, for it became almost impossible for patients to
'
get testimony against a physician who was a member."157
Neal Hogan
states that medical societies not only counted on their members to
testify for defendants but also pressured them not to testify for
plaintiffs;'5 8 he notes "examples of physicians who refused to testify,
and even of those who gave as their reason pressure from fellow
members, and their society."' 59
At the same time that organized medicine was active in seeking to
protect its members from external discipline through malpractice
liability, it failed to provide an effective internal mechanism for
disciplining physicians whose performance was substandard. Carl
Ameringer notes that at mid-century, "[s]tate medical boards.., were
the profession's gatekeepers. They licensed the qualified, banished
the unqualified, and shielded the profession from external review.""
However, "formal discipline [by boards] in the form of a suspended or
revoked license was rare," and control was instead exercised by "a
network of institutions operating at the local level."''

D. Critiques of Self-Regulation and Increasesin External
Accountability
After World War II, "[tihe failure of physicians to adequately
police their ranks led to claims that a 'conspiracy of silence' flourished
in the medical community."' 62 Though the profession took some
actions in response to these concerns,' 63 questions remained. As late
as 1983, Robert Derbyshire, a former President of the Federation of
155. Id. at 81.
156. See id. at 111; see also De Ville, supra note 25, at 210-13.
157. Starr, supra note 151, at 111.
158. See Hogan, supra note 145, at 38, 100-01; see also id. at 82 ("Strong pressure
could be brought to bear against those physicians who chose to testify for plaintiffs.").
159. Id. at 99.
160. Carl F. Ameringer, State Medical Boards and the Politics of Public Protection
14 (1999).
161. Id. at 22.
162. Id. at 29; see also Hogan, supra note 145, at 106, 177 n.231 (discussing the use
of the term "conspiracy of silence" by Melvin Belli, a prominent plaintiff's lawyer).
163. See Ameringer, supra note 160, at 29-30; Hogan, supra note 145, at 110, 13537.
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State Medical Boards of the United States, asserted that "many
disciplinary bodies seem more interested in protecting their medical
colleagues than in safeguarding the public."1 " In the mid-1990s,
Timothy Jost observed:
The number of physicians disciplined by medical boards, though
growing in recent years, is still only a tiny fraction of practicing
physicians....
Though disciplinary actions specifically based on incompetence have
become more common in recent years, they are still unusual....

Perhaps the most important factor limiting the effectiveness of
medical boards in addressing incompetence is the fact that most
licensure boards are still composed predominantly of physicians.
Physicians are reluctant to criticize each other for technical and
judgment errors ....

If rehabilitative sanctions are available, these

may be more palatable, as may be disciplinary actions not disclosed
to the public. But physicians are clearly unenthusiastic about the
use of serious licensure actions to sanction medical errors. 65
Though physicians' hesitancy to discipline their colleagues may
have held constant over the years, other forces have lessened
physicians' control over their profession.
For example, doctors
increasingly are subjected to oversight by managed care
organizations."6 In addition, a growing number of patients seek to
inform themselves and to exercise judgment with respect to their
treatment options.167 Viewed in this context, the threat and reality of
164. Robert C. Derbyshire, How Effective is Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 Law &
Hum. Behav. 193, 196 (1983).
165. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation,
Management, or the Market?, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 825, 862-64 (1995) (citations omitted).
166. See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Bargaining with Hippocrates:Managed Care and the
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 694-95 (2003) (noting that
"[m]anaged care characteristically imposes external controls on physicians' spending
decisions" and that it "also seeks to encourage physicians to internalize the ethos of
cost-cutting and cost-effective medical practice" (citation omitted)).
167. The development-in the late 1950s to early 1970s-of the modern legal
notion of "informed consent" played a key role in reorienting the profession from a
model of deference to physicians' judgment to a model of patient choice. See Ruth R.
Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent 125-32
(1986). As Faden and Beauchamp explain:
Physicians had heretofore considered the physician-patient relationship by
beginning from the patient's submission to the physician's professional
beneficence. The law enlarged that perspective by viewing the relationship
within a wider social framework, emphasizing instead that patients
voluntarily initiate the relationship and have the right to define its
boundaries to fit their own ends.
Id. at 142-43. More broadly, Marc Rodwin has described ways in which "the
movements involving.., patients' rights[,] medical consumerism[,] women's health[,]
and disability rights.., have fostered the ideal of serving patients, promoting
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malpractice litigation-in which lay judges and juries decide whether
to hold a doctor liable-present yet another incursion on physicians'
control of their professional lives.
E. Connections to the PresentDebate
In the conclusion of his book on nineteenth century medical
jurisprudence, James Mohr notes that then, as now,
the medical profession and the state.., maintained a deeply
ambiguous relationship over medico-legal matters in the United
States. On the one hand, the influence of physicians on public policy
has been substantial; on the other, the state has consistently refused
decision-making directly into the hands of the
to put medico-legal
68
profession.'
As Jay Gold has argued, that tension pervades all areas of health
law. 169 In particular, this part has demonstrated that, in the nineteenth
century, medical liability suits and medical evidence presented areas
of conflict between physicians and the legal system. The next part
discusses the current incarnation of that conflict. As will be seen, the
issues raised by physicians today have their roots in the dynamics of
the nineteenth century. One major change, however, is that we now
possess empirical data against which to assess doctors' claims
concerning the legal system.17 °
II. EMPIRICAL DATA AND PROCEDURAL REFORMS
The current debate over medical liability includes many of the
critiques physicians made in the nineteenth century. Many doctors
today assert that judges are prone to admit dubious expert testimony.
Doctors often charge that juries are incapable of distinguishing good
expert testimony from bad, and that juries reach unwarranted findings
of liability and award excessive damages. This part will assess the
extent to which existing data support these critiques. 171 Before
[patient] autonomy, and promoting a more responsible and humane health care
system," though Rodwin also concludes that these movements "[have] had limited
success" in achieving these goals. Marc A. Rodwin, PatientAccountability and Quality
of Care: Lessons from Medical Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women's Health
and Disability Rights Movements, 20 Am. J.L. & Med. 147, 150 (1994).
168. Mohr, supra note 23, at 252.
169. See Gold, supra note 18, at 145.
170. Admittedly, it would be useful to have more empirical data than we now
possess. Cf. Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous
Litigation Games, 23 Rev. Litig. 47, 49 (2004) (noting the "demand for more empirical
research and work about civil procedure and litigation"). However, as I discuss in
Part II, the existing data provide a number of important insights.
171. Some of the discussion in this Part is drawn from my report for the Pew
Charitable Trusts' Project on Medical Liability in Pennsylvania. See Catherine T.
Struve, Expertise in Medical Malpractice Litigation: Special Courts, Screening Panels,
and Other Options (2003).
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examining the performance of judges and juries in malpractice cases,
however, it is useful to survey some key information concerning the
incidence and resolution of malpractice claims.
A. Data on Malpractice Claims
It is clear that there are far more potential than actual malpractice
claims. Based on hospital and insurance records, the Harvard Medical
Practice Study estimated that some 27,000 hospital patients in New
York State in 1984 were injured as a result of negligent medical care,
but that fewer than 3,800 patients asserted malpractice claims-a
substantial "gap" between potential and actual claims. 172 However,
the study revealed not only a gap but also a mismatch: Researchers
were able to connect forty-seven claims from malpractice insurance
files to hospital records, and determined that harm from negligence
occurred in only eight of these cases.173 Although the researchers
cautioned that their medical record review might not reveal some
types of malpractice (such as a failure to diagnose), 74 the apparent
mismatch does raise questions. A more recent study examining
adverse events and claims in connection with incidents in Utah and
Colorado in1 75 1992 found both a similar "gap" and a similar
"mismatch. '
Of the malpractice claims that are asserted, approximately twofifths end without ever reaching litigation; roughly a third of the
claims closed prior to litigation settle with some payment to the
claimant. 176 Close to nine-tenths of the malpractice claims that do
proceed to litigation are resolved prior to trial; roughly half of those
pre-trial closures involve some payment to the plaintiff, while the
177
other claims are dropped or dismissed without payment.
Malpractice plaintiffs who try their claims to verdict have an unusually
low probability of winning, compared to plaintiffs in other sorts of
cases: Studies of a number of jurisdictions at varying times during the
1960s to 1990s have yielded a range of malpractice plaintiff win rates
172. See Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury,
Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation 69-70 (1993).
173. Id. at 71.
174. See id. Reviewing the study's findings, Randall Bovbjerg observed: "This
mismatch ...is not fully consistent with information from studies of closed claims,
which are more appropriate than hospital records for examining the accuracy of
liability processes. Claims files have more detail about injuries, and closed files
naturally cover the full resolution of each case." Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical
Malpractice: Research and Reform, 79 Va. L. Rev. 2155, 2163 (1993) (book review)
(citation omitted).
175. David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in
Utah and Colorado, 38 Med. Care 250, 253-55 (2000).
176. These figures are based on a nationwide sample of claims closed in 1984. See
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims Closed
in 1984, at 37, 82 (1987).
177. See id.
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"from 13.5 percent to 53 percent, with a median win rate of around 29
percent.""17

Low plaintiff win rates at trial do not prove that plaintiffs bring
meritless cases. The proportion of cases that go to verdict is very
small in comparison to the cases that are resolved prior to trial, and
various theories may explain why the mix of cases the litigants select
179
for trial tends to produce large numbers of defendant verdicts.
Similarly, the data on malpractice lawsuits resolved prior to trial are

consistent with the view that some malpractice plaintiffs lack
information concerning the merits of the claim and must sue to obtain
it. 8 ° This would be true, for example, if necessary evidence were

contained not just in medical records but also in the recollections of
those present during a medical procedure (which the plaintiff might
not be able to ascertain without formal discovery)."
Predictably,
178. Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury: Confronting the
Myths About Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets, and Outrageous Damage Awards 38
(1995). Interestingly, there is some evidence that medical malpractice plaintiffs who
try their claims before a judge tend to do better than those who try their claims before
a jury. Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg studied data from 1979 to 1989
concerning a number of types of cases litigated in federal court. See Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism,
77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1133 (1992). For thirteen types of cases, Clermont and
Eisenberg compared the plaintiff win rate in cases tried before a judge with the
plaintiff win rate in cases tried before a jury. See id. at 1134, 1136-37. They found that
in medical malpractice cases tried before a judge, the plaintiff win rate was .50,
whereas in medical malpractice cases tried before a jury, the plaintiff win rate was .29.
See id. at 1137. Of course, this difference in win rates does not prove that judges are
more favorable to malpractice claimants than juries are, because the difference in
outcomes may be due to differences between the cases tried before a judge and the
cases tried before a jury. See id. at 1162-66 (considering possible reasons for
differences between the two sets of cases).
179. See Vidmar, supra note 178, at 83-92; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 319, 360-66 (1991); Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-Information
Model of Litigation, 22 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 153, 165 (2002) (positing that "win rates
will be less than 50 percent in regimes in which the legal test requires an examination
of the defendant's compliance and the defendant enjoys an informational
advantage").
180. See Henry S. Farber & Michelle J.White, A Comparison of Formal and
Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. Legal Stud. 777, 778 (1994)
[hereinafter Farber & White, Dispute Resolution]; Henry S. Farber & Michelle J.
White, Medical Malpractice:An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process, 22
RAND J. Econ. 199, 200 (1991) [hereinafter Farber & White, Empirical
Examination].
181. In many instances, patients may simply want to know why they suffered an
adverse result, and may drop their claims (without filing suit) after gaining that
information. Other data support the theory that a desire for information can lead
people to assert malpractice claims. For example, in a study of birth-related injuries
and deaths in Florida, researchers found that parents were more likely to file a
malpractice claim if they had not previously been informed that there might be
difficulties with the baby. See Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability,
and the Decision to File a Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 Law & Soc'y Rev. 413, 427
(1995).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

many claimants will drop their suits when it becomes apparent that
the claims lack merit. 182 Moreover, a plaintiff might drop a valid claim
because litigation costs become prohibitive, or because the lawsuit
proves emotionally stressful.183
The key liability questions in a malpractice case concern the
applicable standard of care and the issue of causation. In assessing
each of these questions, the jury will need to rely on specialized
knowledge, which is usually provided by the parties' expert witnesses.
The first major set of issues in a malpractice case concerns the nature
of the physician's duty of care to the patient, and whether the
physician breached that duty.
Outside of medical malpractice, the law of negligence usually asks
whether a "reasonable person" in the defendant's position would have
taken a particular precaution.1 8" In general, an industry's practices do
not define the standard of care, though they may be relevant to it. 185
Medical malpractice is a notable exception: The standard of care has
traditionally been set by reference to "medical custom," meaning
what doctors within the relevant community normally do. 186 Recently,
however, Philip Peters has noted that a minority of states have
replaced the "medical custom" standard with a "reasonable
physician" standard, which permits the jury to find liability even when
a physician followed a standard medical practice. 187 In jurisdictions
that follow the "reasonable physician" standard, expert testimony may
be directed explicitly to the expert's own view of appropriate care. In
other words, expert testimony may seek to establish the standard of
care by reference to the risks and benefits of the relevant precaution,
without having to establish
whether the physician deviated from
1 88
prevailing medical custom.
A traditional justification for the "medical custom" standard is that
lay decision makers are better equipped to ascertain what physicians
actually do than what they should do. On closer examination, either
task can prove challenging. A jury applying the "medical custom"
standard will need expert testimony to determine what the customs
are.
However, experts nominally opining on medical custom
frequently base their testimony more on their own views of
182. See Farber & White, EmpiricalExamination,supra note 180, at 200.
183. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Researching Litigation: The Medical Malpractice
Example, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1988, at 199,204.
184. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About
Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 587, 595
(2002).
185. See id. at 606.
186. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom:
MalpracticeLaw at the Millennium, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 163, 165-66 (2000).
187. See id. at 170.
188. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87
Iowa L. Rev. 909, 920-21 (2002).
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appropriate care than on systematic knowledge of the relevant
community.1i 9 Even if the parties present empirical data concerning
what doctors do in practice, as some commentators advocate, 90 there
To address
is often substantial variation in appropriate treatment.'
schools of
a
"two
adopted
have
jurisdictions
many
problem,
this
thought" doctrine which permits doctors to argue that they should not
endorsed by part, but not
be held liable if they comply with a standard
192
all, of the relevant medical community.
After establishing the standard of care and the physician's breach of
that standard, the plaintiff must show that the breach caused the
plaintiff's injury. In some instances-for example, where a surgeon
operated on the wrong limb-the determination of causation will be
In others, establishing causation will require
straightforward.
examining many similar cases-more than a single practitioner is
likely to see personally-to ascertain how often injuries occur in the
absence of negligence. 193 In other words, a showing of causation often
will be based on probabilistic evidence.194 Moreover, it may be hard
to untangle the defendant's actions from the patient's preexisting
medical problems. 95
In addition to questions of liability, medical malpractice cases also

present questions concerning the amount of damages. Determining
damages is not simply a matter of totaling the plaintiff's past medical
bills and lost wages. The jury also will need to assess the degree and
duration of the impairment a surviving plaintiff will suffer in the
189. See Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in
MalpracticeLitigation, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter & Spring 1991, at 119, 127.
190. See Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases:
Asking Those Who Know, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 699, 726 (2002) (advocating the
use of "surveys of a relevant population of physicians to determine customary (and, if
desired, appropriate or reasonable) care"); Mark A. Hall et al., Measuring Medical
Practice Patterns:Sources of Evidence from Health Services Research, 37 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 779, 779 (2002) (discussing "sources of evidence from the field of health
services research that might be used to establish the standard of care in medical
malpractice cases"); William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51
Duke L.J. 629, 631 (2001).
191. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Empirical Evidence and Malpractice Litigation, 37
Wake Forest L. Rev. 757, 772 (2002) (noting evidence that "physician practices vary
widely, even within narrow geographic limits").
192. See Cramm et al., supra note 190, at 704-05.
193. See William Meadow, Operationalizingthe Standard of Medical Care: Uses
and Limitations of Epidemiology to Guide Expert Testimony in Medical Negligence
Allegations, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 675, 681 (2002).
194. Cf Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of
Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-SubstanceLitigation, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 469, 490
(1988) (noting, with respect to toxic tort cases, that "[t]he scientific association
between a toxic substance and injury to a person relies on probabilistic evidence:
epidemiological studies and statistical associations" (citation omitted)).
195. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Urban Inst., Medical Malpractice: Problems and
Reforms 4 (1995) ("New harm caused by treatment can be hard to tell from normal
variation in harm attending the underlying illness or injury.").
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future. Estimating the cost of lifetime care for a permanently injured
plaintiff will require expert testimony on life expectancy, on the
plaintiff's future medical needs, and on the projected costs of that
future care. 9 6 In addition, calculations concerning the amount of the
plaintiff's loss of future earning power will be necessary. Ordinarily,
the plaintiff will seek damages for noneconomic losses as well, which
will require the jury to assign a monetary value to the plaintiff's
prospective pain and suffering. 9 7 The plaintiff may also request
punitive damages, which are designed to punish willfully wrongful
behavior on the part of the defendant. 198 However, punitive damages
are rarely awarded in medical malpractice cases. 199
As this discussion suggests, some malpractice cases can present
challenging issues of liability and damages. Moreover, the data
indicating a "mismatch" between injuries from medical negligence
and the claims that are actually asserted raises a question as to the
system's ability to distinguish valid from invalid claims. As noted,
most malpractice claims will settle prior to trial; however, the
decisions made by judges and juries in the cases that do go to trial
provide information used by other litigants in deciding whether to
come to a pretrial resolution. Thus, Part II.B. assesses the capacity of
judges and juries to address common issues in malpractice cases.
B. The Performanceof Judges and Juries
Research indicates that judges could benefit from better training in
the scientific principles necessary to the application of the Daubert
approach to expert testimony. The available data suggest that jury
performance is better than critics sometimes assert. However, juries'
liability determinations might be aided, in complex cases, by a neutral
and understandable exposition of issues of standard of care and
causation. In addition, jury determinations of noneconomic damages
could improve if juries were provided with more guidance.
1. Judges
Nineteenth century physicians' complaints about judges in
malpractice cases echo through today's debates on medical liability.
Physicians today, like their counterparts a century and a half ago,
charge that judges allow unqualified or venal experts to present
196. See, e.g., Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury
Instruction on Damage Awards, 6 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 743, 745 (2000) (noting
that "calculations [of economic damages] must take into account forecasts about
future medical care needs, available job opportunities, and projected life
expectancies").
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, In Defense of Tort Law 136
(2001).
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dubious testimony. Despite the similarity of the criticisms, however,
the landscape of the law concerning expert testimony has changed in
the interim.
As discussed in Part I.B., the law governing the admissibility of
medical expert testimony in the mid-nineteenth century was
confounded by the lack of regulation of the medical profession itself.
Because all manner of regular and irregular physicians could practice
medicine, courts similarly permitted all kinds of physicians to testify.
In the twentieth century, more control has been exercised over the
testimony of medical expert witnesses, though the nature and source
of the control have varied.
In courts that follow the test set forth in Frye v. United States, °0 the
judge asks whether the proposed expert employs an approach that is
generally accepted in the relevant medical or scientific community.20 1
As commentators have observed, this approach delegates authority to
the expert community to determine which experts' testimony will be
admissible in court. 2 The Frye test has the advantage of requiring
relatively little expertise from the judge. However, because it seems
likely that there is a time lag between the introduction of an advance
in knowledge and its general acceptance in the pertinent scientific
community, the Frye test might be either under- or over-inclusive in
certain cases: It might erroneously exclude testimony based on a
method that will soon be accepted as valid, or it might erroneously
admit testimony based on a method soon to be condemned as
outdated.
The competing approach, formulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
2 3 promises increased accuracy
Pharmaceuticals,
but demands greater
judicial expertise .2 ° Rather than relying on the judgment of the
relevant professional community, a judge following Daubert performs
an independent evaluation of the expert's method, considering such
factors as "whether it can be (and has been) tested," whether it "has
been subjected to peer review and publication," the method's error
rate, any applicable standards for its application, and whether the
method is generally accepted in the relevant expert community.

200. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (holding, with respect to litigation in federal courts, that "the
Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
201. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
202. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and
Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 141, 148 (2003),
(noting that the Frye standard "pass[es] the buck back to the expert field itself, and
accept[s] the standards it imposes on itself").
203. 509 U.S. at 579.
204. See Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 877, 890 (2002) ("The exacting requirements that Daubert and its
progeny impose on lay judges have been the subject of considerable controversy.").
205. Daubert,509 U.S. at 593-94.
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Some data suggest that many judges may need training in order
properly to apply the Dauberttest. In one recent study, researchers
who surveyed several hundred state court judges found that "many of
the judges surveyed lacked the scientific literacy seemingly
necessitated by Daubert.'' 2°6 In particular, "[j]udges had the most
difficulty operationalizing falsifiability and error rate, with only 5% of
the respondents demonstrating a clear understanding of falsifiability
and only 4% demonstrating a clear understanding of error rate. 2 °7
Apart from the standard debate over the competing merits of the
Frye and Daubert approaches, there is an additional question, in the
malpractice context, concerning the extent to which courts actually
follow either approach. Daniel Shuman argues that the Frye test has
not figured prominently in malpractice litigation: "[O]nce the expert
was determined to be qualified, the reliability of the expert's methods
and procedures was typically left to the jury. "208 Moreover, Shuman
asserts that even in jurisdictions that have adopted Daubert,courts do
not appear to use the Daubert factors to scrutinize medical
malpractice expert testimony. On the question of standard of care,
Shuman argues that the lax approach to expert testimony is closely
related to the courts' willingness to "accept testimony as to customary
practice without demanding methodologically sound survey evidence
of its adoption, let alone rigorous proof of efficacy. "209 Even on
questions of causation, though, where "it might be expected that
Daubert would have a more profound effect," Shuman's review of
reported decisions found only a "modest" impact.10
It seems, then, that not all judges currently apply rigorous scrutiny
to medical expert testimony in malpractice cases. However, to the
extent that judges are engaged in assessing the appropriateness of
medical or scientific testimony under Daubert, those judges would
likely benefit from improved training with respect to basic scientific
and medical principles.
2. Juries
Contemporary critiques of jury performance resonate with the
complaints physicians made in the nineteenth century.2
Many
206. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers:A NationalSurvey of Judges
on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 Law & Hum. Behav. 433,
433 (2001).
207. Id.
208. Shuman, supra note 12, at 280.
209. Id. at 280-81 (citations omitted); see also supra note 190 (listing sources that
propose empirical methods for ascertaining medical custom).
210. Shuman, supra note 12, at 281.
211. Current indictments of jury performance are not limited to the medical
malpractice context. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 178, at 1127 (noting
a popular perception, with respect to personal injury lawsuits, that "[juries... find
liability when judges would not .... grant higher awards than judges, and... grant
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physicians today believe that outcomes in medical malpractice cases
are largely random, or are linked only to the severity of the plaintiff's

disability and not to the presence or absence of fault on the part of the
physician.212 Some physicians assert that this apparently haphazard
threat leads them to engage in defensive medicine or drives them out
of high-risk practice or geographic areas.2 13

Criticisms of jury competence can now be measured against two
sets of data: studies concerning jury performance in cases involving
complex evidence, and studies of jury performance in malpractice
cases in particular. Those studies reveal some room for improvement
with respect to both liability and damages determinations.

Some studies suggest that jurors may experience difficulty in
processing complex information, and, in particular, that jurors may
have trouble evaluating the strength of statistical evidence. For
example, Joe Cecil, Valerie Hans and Elizabeth Wiggins reviewed a

general study of juror performance in twenty-nine protracted civil
trials, as well as case studies of a handful of other complex trials, and
concluded that the jurors studied showed varying degrees of
understanding of the evidence.2" 4 However, they observed that jurors
with higher levels of understanding appeared to play an important
inappropriate punitive damages awards" (citations omitted)); Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and
Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 988 (2003) (noting tort reformers' propensity to "characteriz[e]
juries as unsophisticated bodies more concerned with compensating sympathetic
victims than with administering consistent justice").
212. For example, one set of researchers surveyed physicians who practiced in
neonatal intensive care units in 1993. See William Meadow et al., Physicians'
Experience with Allegations of Medical Malpractice in the Neonatal Intensive Care
Unit, Pediatrics, May 1997, at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/99/5/elO. The
researchers asked the respondents about the respondents' personal experiences with
malpractice claims. The results were dramatic:
On a scale of 1 to 4 (4 being most reasonable) the median assessment of the
reasonableness of malpractice allegations was 1, mean 1.2. On a scale of I to
4 (4 being the highest) the median assessment of effectiveness of the current
system in identifying true malpractice was 1, mean 1.4.
Id. The study relied on the respondent physicians' perceptions of the claims with
which the respondents had been personally involved, and did not attempt to assess
independently the accuracy of the respondents' perceptions. Although the study thus
does not provide an objective assessment of the malpractice litigation system, the
study does provide a vivid illustration of physicians' perceptions of that system.
213. See, e.g., Richard E. Anderson, Billions for Defense: The Pervasive Nature of
Defensive Medicine, 159 Archives Internal Med. 2399, 2400 (1999) ("[P]hysicians are
so averse to malpractice suits that nearly all clinical judgments are influenced."); Press
Release, American Medical Association President-elect, Donald J. Palmisano, AMA
Supports Health Act to Bring Common Sense to Our Liability System (Feb. 6, 2003)
("In crisis states, ob-gyns have been forced to stop delivering babies, trauma centers
have closed, and physicians are grappling with how they can continue to provide other
high-risk procedures."), at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/1617-7251.html.
214. Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons From
Civil Jury Trials, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 727, 756 (1991).
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part in deliberations, and they suggested that modifications in trial
procedure-such as narrowing or sequencing issues, using courtappointed experts, and permitting jurors to take notes and ask
questions-might improve overall jury performance.2 15 They also
reviewed a number of jury simulation studies which suggest that jurors
may misperceive the persuasiveness of statistical evidence and may
have difficulty spotting faulty reasoning in probabilistic testimony.
Although one of those studies presented a more positive view of jury
comprehension than the others, all the studies suggested that jurors
experience some difficulty with statistical evidence.216
Cognitive biases also appear to affect jury findings on liability.
"Hindsight bias"-the human tendency to view an event as having
been more probable because it in fact occurred-and "outcome
bias"-the tendency to view a decision as poorer quality because the
decision in fact led to a bad outcome-affect assessments by various
decision makers, including juries. 217 Thus, the fact that a medical
malpractice plaintiff suffered harm may make juries more inclined to
find a breach of the standard of care. However, to the extent that
juries rely on evidence of medical custom to determine the question,
hindsight bias may play a smaller role.21 8
Despite these potential difficulties, there are reasons for optimism
concerning jury performance. For one thing, juries may tend to
perform better in assessing liability than their members would
individually. Although group deliberation probably will not eliminate
the effects of hindsight bias, 219 deliberation should improve juries'
ability to process complex information, to the extent that jurors with
better understanding take "leadership roles" in the deliberations.22 °
Moreover, studies of jury performance find a degree of correlation
between case strength and liability determinations. 22' Frank Sloan,
215. See id. at 766-72.
216. See id. at 756-60.
217. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight,65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 587-88 (1998).
218. See id. at 574, 612. Rachlinski notes that the comparative negligence doctrine
may reduce the extent to which juror hindsight bias favors plaintiffs, because the bias
may also make jurors more likely to find the plaintiff partially responsible for the
poor outcome. See id. at 594-95. However, malpractice cases may be less likely than
other types of personal injury tort suits to support a comparative negligence defense,
because in many malpractice cases the patient played a passive role in the treatment.
Thus, to the extent that viable comparative negligence arguments are less frequently
available to medical malpractice defendants than to other tort defendants, the
hindsight bias may have a somewhat stronger systematic effect than it otherwise
would.
219. See id. at 595.
220. Cecil et al., supra note 214, at 753 (citation omitted).
221. By contrast, at least one study suggests that parties' settlement decisions may
fail to reflect actual liability. In a follow-up to the Harvard study of New York
hospitals, researchers examined fifty-one malpractice claims. See Troyen A. Brennan
et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-
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Penny Githens, and Gerald Hickson presented data on reviewing
physicians' views of thirty-seven malpractice cases that went to a jury
verdict.22 Researchers had provided information on the claims to
panels of physician reviewers, and asked the reviewers to assess
negligence and causation. 22 3 In the twenty-four cases that went to
verdict and ended with a plaintiff recovering damages,224 the physician
reviewers were twice as likely to have found the defendants "liable" as
they were to have found them "not liable. ' 22 1 Conversely, in the
thirteen cases which went to verdict and ended with no damages
recovery by the plaintiff, the reviewers were twice as likely to have
found the
defendants "not liable" as they were to have found them
226
"liable."
Henry Farber and Michelle White studied hospital records
concerning claims made against a particular hospital or its staff with
respect to incidents that occurred between 1976 and 1989.27 The
hospital records included evaluations of the quality of care, which
were protected from discovery and which the hospital used to make
decisions about litigation. 228 The evaluations were performed by
internal staff in many cases, but the hospital also sought outside
Malpractice Litigation, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 1963, 1963 (1996). Forty-six of the
claims were closed by the end of 1995; of these claims, only one went to a jury trial.
See id. at 1964. Interestingly, although Brennan et al. had identified that case as
involving an adverse event due to negligence, the jury found for the defendant. See id.
at 1964-65. Of the other forty-five claims, twenty-four closed without payment and
twenty-one settled with a payment by the defense. See id. at 1964. The researchers
found that "neither the presence of an adverse event nor that of an adverse event due
to negligence was associated with the outcome of the litigation"; rather, the reviewers'
rating of the plaintiff's degree of disability "was the only significant predictor of
payment." Id. at 1965.
Of course, this study tells us nothing about jury behavior, beyond the fact that
in the one case that went to a jury, the jury found for the defendant despite evidence
of negligence. It does provide some evidence of the defense's expectations of what a
jury would do, because the defense's expectation of the risk of losing at trial will
inform the decision to settle. However, the defense's willingness to pay to settle a
case will also reflect the defense's projected cost of litigating a case to verdict, even if
the defense expects to win at trial. In this regard, it is suggestive that in eight of the
twenty-one cases where the plaintiff obtained a settlement, the settlement was less
than $25,000-and as the authors note, "discussions with insurers indicated that
settlements of less than $25,000 were nuisance settlements-settlements of claims
thought to be without merit that could be resolved with a relatively small payment."
Id. at 1967.
222. See Frank A. Sloan et al., The Dispute Resolution Process, in Suing for
Medical Malpractice 153-86 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1993).
223. See id. at 166.
224. Some of these recoveries apparently occurred by means of a post-verdict
settlement. See id.
225. See id. at 166-68; Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury:
An EmpiricalPerspective, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 849, 859 (1998).
226. See Sloan et al., supra note 222, at 166-68; Vidmar, supra note 225, at 859.
227. Farber & White, Dispute Resolution, supra note 180, at 786. Their review was
limited to claims "that were resolved by mid-1993." Id.
228. See id. at 787.
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evaluations of claims that proceeded to litigation. 29 Cases were coded
either "bad" (where raters perceived clear negligence), "good" (where
raters perceived clear absence of negligence), or "ambiguous" (where
ratings were ambiguous or inconsistent). 230
By comparing jury
verdicts with the hospital's internal ratings, Farber and White
determined that the jury found for the defendant in all the cases that
the hospital had rated as having "good" care, that the jury found for
the plaintiff in two of the four cases that the hospital had identified as
involving "bad" care, and that the jury found for the plaintiff in one of
the four lawsuits for which the hospital's rating was "ambiguous. "231
Bryan Liang provided summaries of the facts of twelve actual cases
to academic anesthesiologists and asked them to rate whether or not
the defendant was negligent.232 He found that the physicians'
evaluations accorded with the juries' actual verdicts only fifty-six to
fifty-eight percent of the time, and that in five of the twelve cases
there was "significant" disagreement between the anesthesiologists
and the jury.233 Notably, however, in four of those five cases the
disagreement arose because physicians tended to find negligence and
the jury had not.234
Taken together, these findings suggest a fair degree of correlation
between jury determinations of liability and independent evaluations
of case strength. They also illustrate that in the cases where physician
reviewers and juries disagree, it is not always because the juries find
liability where the reviewers do not; often, the converse is true.
Critics, however, focus not only on liability determinations but also on
damage awards; they argue that jury awards are unpredictable and
that, while some awards may fall within reasonable ranges, others are
inordinately high.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that group deliberations will
affect a jury's ultimate award. When David Schkade, Cass Sunstein
and Daniel Kahneman performed a study of punitive damages awards
using six-person mock juries, they found that the jury awards were
both higher and more variable than the pre-deliberation amounts that

229. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 802. The figures provided by Farber and White are slightly confusing.
They state that plaintiffs won four of the twenty-six cases that went to verdict. See id.
They then specify that plaintiffs won none of the thirteen lawsuits in which care was
rated "good," and that plaintiffs won "two of the four lawsuits with bad care and one
of the four lawsuits with ambiguous care." Id. These more specific figures, however,
seem to account for only three of the four plaintiff wins and twenty-one of the twentysix verdicts cited by the authors.
232. See Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case
Study of an Anesthesiology Department, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 121, 125-27
(1997).
233. Id. at 129.
234. See id. at 129, 158-60 tbls. 2A-2F.
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individual mock jurors would have awarded3 5
Shari Seidman
Diamond, Michael Saks and Stephan Landsman used six-person mock
juries to examine the effects of deliberation on damages awards for
economic loss and for pain and suffering. This study, like the Schkade
study, found that mean jury awards tended to be higher than the mean
award that the individual jurors would have awarded absent
deliberation.2 36
However, Diamond et al. found that "[a]s a
percentage of mean award... jury variability was lower than juror
'
variability for both types of damage awards."237
At any rate, larger
juries should tend to reach less variable results than smaller juries.23 8
In general, studies indicate that appropriate factors such as the
severity of the plaintiffs' injuries explain a considerable portion of the
variation in jury awards. 239 However, significant variability may
remain, particularly with respect to noneconomic damages. 240 To the
extent that the variation in awards remains unexplained by legitimate
factors, problems other than jury incompetence or irresponsibility
may be to blame. In many jurisdictions, juries are not permitted to
pose questions to witnesses or to take notes.2 4' Jury instructions
sometimes are phrased in confusing language. Defendants' lawyers
may compound the problem by deciding not to put in evidence
concerning damages, for fear of appearing to concede liability.2 42 The
235. See David A. Schkade et al., DeliberatingAbout Dollars: The Severity Shift, in
Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide 43-44 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002).
236. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and
Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DePaul L. Rev.
301, 316 (1998). On the other hand, another recent experimental study compared
awards by six and twelve-person juries with awards by individuals, and found that the
mean award by individuals was greater than the mean award by juries (though the
difference was only weakly significant). See James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group
Size and ProceduralInfluence on Consensus Judgments of Quantity: The Examples of
Damage Award and Mock Civil Juries, 73 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 703, 714
(1997). The same study found that the mean twelve-person jury award was smaller
than the mean six-person jury award. See id. at 713.
237. Diamond et al., supra note 236, at 317.
238. See Vidmar, supra note 225, at 897.
239. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical
Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 997, 1019,
1025 (1990).
240. In their jury experiment, Diamond, Saks and Landsman found that the
amounts juries awarded for pain and suffering were about twice as variable as the
juries' awards for economic damages. See Diamond et al., supra note 236, at 317.
Likewise, in a study of actual jury verdicts in personal injury cases in Florida and
Kansas City during 1973-1987, Randall Bovbjerg, Frank Sloan, and James Blumstein
found that awards of noneconomic damages were more variable than total awards.
See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 908, 937 tbl. 3 (1989).
241. Though each of these practices has potential drawbacks, each might help to
improve jurors' understanding and retention of relevant evidence. See Cecil et al.,
supra note 214, at 768-69.
242. See Vidmar, supra note 178, at 197-98, 247. One treatise designed for use by
medical malpractice defense lawyers advises defense lawyers to put in evidence on
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result is that juries may be given little direction on noneconomic
damages.
C. ProceduralReforms that Reflect Physicians'Concerns

States have implemented a number of procedural reforms in
response to the asserted crisis in malpractice litigation. I focus here

on three reforms that connect with the physician critiques identified in
Part I. I first discuss states' use of medical screening panels to provide
pretrial opinions on malpractice claims. Panel proposals can be seen
to reflect both physicians' suspicion of malpractice determinations by
lay jurors and some physicians' preference for informal, nonjudicial
resolution of malpractice claims.243 Next, I discuss proposals for

special medical liability courts. Proposals for specialized courts arise
from the perceived need for expertise in adjudicating malpractice
claims, and in particular in setting the standard of care. I then
examine a novel remittitur standard, recently adopted in
Pennsylvania, that requires the judge, in considering a defendant's

assertion that damages are excessive, to take into account the
anticipated effect of the damages award on access to health care in the
community. Finally, I review briefly some indications that the medical
community itself is resorting to certain kinds of "self-help" in
combating perceived problems with medical liability litigation.
1. Medical Screening Panels
At first glance, medical screening panels might seem a promising
way to address some physician concerns about the way in which the
legal system handles malpractice claims. 2" Indeed, as discussed in
damages; the authors state that "[p]ost-verdict interviews ... with jurors who heard a
full damages defense presented by economic experts called by the defense...
revealed that jurors rarely felt that the defense was conceding liability by offering an
alternative damages presentation." Miles J. Zaremski & Frank D. Heckman,
Reengineering Healthcare Liability Litigation 287 (1997).
243. As noted, support for medical screening panels arises partly from criticism of
the performance of lay judges and juries in handling medical questions. In this
respect, the panel proposals somewhat resemble proposals to send complex scientific
questions to a "science court" composed partly or wholly of scientists. See Brennan,
supra note 11, at 10-19 (reviewing proposals for, and examples of, "science courts"
and "science panels"); see also James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75
Mich. L. Rev. 1058, 1069 (1977) (advocating experimentation with a "science court"
to aid "Congress or the Executive ... in the determination of global policy issues").
244. Cf. Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970s: A
Retrospective, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1986, at 5, 25 (discussing 1970s
legislative initiatives to address medical malpractice, and stating that "[t]he goal in
establishing.., screening panels was to improve the quality of fault-finding by the
system and thus both to discourage the bringing of questionable claims and to
encourage the settlement of valid ones"). In addition, panels might be expected to
address other problems of less interest to physicians but of concern to other
commentators. Only a small portion of potential malpractice claims are ever asserted.
Panels might address this underclaiming problem by encouraging the assertion of
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Part I, some medico-legal writers in the nineteenth century proposed
the use of systems resembling such panels in malpractice cases and
From the physician's
other cases involving medical issues. 245
perspective, a panel system might be useful to the extent that it
encourages earlier, informal resolution of malpractice claims. 46
Physicians who believe that most malpractice claims are meritless
might hope that a negative panel determination would encourage the
early withdrawal of the claim. Physicians might also be reassured by
the fact that if the case proceeded to trial, the jury would hear not
only the opinions of the parties' experts, but also the views of the
medical screening panel. 47
claims. Similarly, to the extent that some patients simply want to find out what went
wrong, panels might provide a relatively low-cost venue for acquiring such
information.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 120-25. Stakeholders in a number of states
that adopted screening panel provisions have held positive views of them. For
example, a mid-1980s study of interest groups in Indiana found that a physician group,
the state bar association, and the state department of insurance "agreed that the panel
process had decreased the number of claims that go to trial." U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, Medical Malpractice: Case Study on Indiana 12 (1986). The state medical
association also believed that the panel system "decreases the time required to close
claims," and a large insurance company "attributed its much lower legal costs to
defend claims in Indiana to the panel process." Id. A similar survey of groups in
Florida found varying assessments: An official of a trial lawyers' association
recounted that plaintiffs' lawyers viewed the panels as biased (due to the presence of
a physician on the panel) and thus that plaintiffs who lost before the panel tended to
pursue the claim nonetheless. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice:
Case Study on Florida 11-12 (1986). On the other hand, a physician group, a hospital
association, a defense lawyers' association, and the state insurance department
"strongly supported" reinstitution of panels. As one insurance company executive
argued, "Our tort system cannot supply a jury that is truly comprised of the
defendant's peers." Id. at 35. In New York, by contrast, the state bar association, a
trial lawyers' association, and a hospital underwriters' association all opined that
panels led to undesirable delay. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical
Malpractice: Case Study on New York 20 (1986).
246. See, e.g., James W. Hughes, The Effect of Medical Malpractice Reform Laws
on Claim Disposition, 9 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 57, 65 (1989) (arguing that a screening
panel's "impartial opinion should greatly improve the parties' information of the
expected value of the claim, increasing the probability of a claim being settled"). In
this respect, a screening panel might perform a function analogous to "early neutral
evaluation." See, e.g., Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategiesin
Medical Malpractice,9 Alaska L. Rev. 429, 453 (1992) (noting that Alaska's screening
panel system is "akin to an early neutral evaluation process"); id. at 442 (stating that
the goal of early neutral evaluation is "that the parties will benefit by the evaluator's
neutral assessment of the value of the case and therefore reconsider their positions").
Some data suggest, however, that some physicians may wish to go to trial rather than
settle, in order to attempt to clear their professional reputations. See Samuel R. Gross
& Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement,
44 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 58 (1996) (arguing that "the high rate of zero offers in medical
malpractice cases is best explained by the desire of physicians for vindication at
trial").
247. Cf Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative
Dispute Resolution?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1991, at 171, 193 (noting that
"some ADR procedures, particularly early neutral evaluation, expert panels, and
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The available data 21 suggest, however, that panels are not a good

option for providing expertise to the jury at trial. Panels may
encourage the pretrial resolution of claims, but there is no way to
assess whether this result is an improvement from a public policy
standpoint without knowing whether the resolved claims would have
been brought if panel proceedings had not been available and whether
claims that were dropped due to the panel system lacked merit.

In all, some thirty-one states adopted screening panels of some
sort. 49 Only twenty of those states still have panel systems; in the
others, panel provisions were repealed and/or invalidated.2

The

medical malpractice screening panels, may offer opportunities for expanding the role
of neutral experts in the litigation process").
248. It should be noted that the evidence on panel performance provides only
limited guidance for current policymaking. Of the available multistate studies that
looked at panel performance, one analyzes data concerning 1992; four other studies
analyze data that extends into the mid-1980s; and the rest use data from the 1970s.
These studies may be of limited predictive value to the extent that malpractice
litigation has changed in recent years. Cf William M. Sage, Understandingthe First
Malpractice Crisis of the 21st Century, in Health Law Handbook 1, 2 (Alice G.
Gosfield ed., 2003) (noting that "[t]he current crisis is not simply a reprise of events in
the 1970s or 1980s"). Moreover, some studies may not have captured the longer-term
effects of panel systems: Because the first wave of panel system adoptions occurred in
the mid-1970s, data from the 1970s only gives a sense of panels' short-term effects.
Finally, some studies' results may have been blurred by the fact that researchers
aggregated differing panel systems into one or only a few categories: Aggregating
different systems into one variable (panel versus no panel), or even into a couple of
variables (panel versus no panel, mandatory versus voluntary panels, admissible
versus non-admissible panel findings), means that panel systems which produce
particularly strong effects may be balanced out by panel systems with weaker
systematic effects, such that the overall impact of panels looks weaker than it may, in
fact, be in some states.
249. Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming adopted panel provisions, but (as noted below) not all these states still
have them. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
250. Panel provisions have been repealed in Arizona, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Illinois instituted two different
panel systems, and repealed them both; however, to list Illinois as a repeal state might
be viewed as double-counting, because both provisions were judicially invalidated
prior to their repeal. Likewise, Florida repealed a panel provision in 1983, but the
repeal followed the judicial invalidation of that provision in 1980. (Subsequent to the
1983 repeal, Florida adopted new provisions permitting procedures that have some
aspects of a medical screening panel.)
Panel provisions have been invalidated in Florida, Illinois, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1980)
(invalidating panel system because, as implemented, it deprived doctors of their right
to mediation because proceedings in many cases did not conclude within the statutory
deadline, and because extending that deadline would deprive malpractice plaintiffs of
their right of access to the courts); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d
736, 739 (Ill. 1976) (striking down panel provision because it mixed lay and judicial
functions in violation of state constitution); Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763 (Ill.
1986) (striking down subsequent panel provision on similar grounds); Cardinal
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basic concept is to provide panels, composed partly or wholly of
physicians, to opine on the merits of malpractice claims.25' Some
panel systems are mandatory, while others are voluntary. 5 2 Some
screen claims prior to the filing of the complaint, while others screen
claims after filing.253 Panels typically have from three to seven
members, and panel composition varies: Some panels include only
2 54
physicians, while others include lawyers, judges, and/or laypeople.
There also are variations in the amount of discovery permitted, the
types of evidence allowed, the extent of the panel proceedings, and
the scope of the panel findings (liability only, or liability and
damages). 5
Some systems provide that the panel findings are
admissible at a later trial, and some permit the panel members to be
called as witnesses.2 6 Finally, some systems attempt to discourage the
party who loses before the panel from proceeding further, by
providing for the imposition of costs or other fees. 7
The existing studies are less useful than they might be because they
did not look directly at whether panel systems increase the accuracy of
adjudication.2 8 Rather, these studies focused mostly on panels' effect
on the frequency and/or severity of malpractice claims, or on their
effect on malpractice premiums. From a public policy standpoint,
increases in frequency and severity of claims could be a good thing-if
the additional claims are valid-or a bad thing-if the additional
claims lack merit. Similarly, a decrease in malpractice premiums is
desirable, but not if it is achieved by preventing plaintiffs from
recovering on valid claims.
Some data suggest that the presence of a panel mechanism may
actually increase claim frequency.2 9 This presumably was not the
Glennon Mem'l Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979) (holding that
panel provision violated state constitutional right of access to courts); Mattos v.
Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1980) (invalidating panel system because, as
implemented, it resulted in such delays as to violate state constitutional right to a jury
trial); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that panel provision violated
state constitutional guarantee of equal protection).
251. See Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed
Model Legislation to CureJudicialIlls, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 181, 186 (1990).
252. See id. at 188-89.
253. See id. at 189.
254. See id. at 189-90.
255. See id. at 190-91.
256. See id. at 193-94.
257. See id. at 194-96.
258. Admittedly, it is difficult to measure the accuracy of litigation results.
259. Researchers at the National Center for State Courts examined state court data
on the frequency of medical malpractice claim dispositions in twenty-one states
during 1992, and found that states with mandatory panels had a significantly greater
rate of litigation. See Roger Hanson et al., What is the Role of State Doctrine in
Understanding Tort Litigation?, 1 Mich. L. & Pol'y Rev. 43, 65-71 (1996). Because
Hanson et al. focused only on litigation resolved in 1992, and did not examine changes
over time, their results leave open the possibility that the causal link might run the
other way-i.e., that states with higher litigation rates might have been more likely to
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intent of physicians who supported the adoption of panels. However,

these data imply that at least some panel systems might provide a less
costly alternative to litigation for claimants with smaller claims and for
those 26who simply want to know more about the cause of their
injury.

0

However, even if panels encourage claiming by some plaintiffs,
panels' costs in time and money may discourage claiming by others.
In many instances, the parties will need to conduct discovery in order

to gather the evidence necessary for a comprehensive panel

presentation.2 61 Panels often will need to hold live hearings in order to

reach an accurate assessment.262 In jurisdictions where the panel's

findings are admissible at trial, the parties will likely feel the need to
engage in exhaustive discovery and a plenary presentation 263-which26
will "entail the costs and delay that panels are intended to prevent.
adopt mandatory panel systems. Nonetheless, their finding is suggestive.
Shmanske and Stevens studied Arizona's panel system, using insurance claim
file data from 1972-1979. See Stephen Shmanske & Tina Stevens, The Performanceof
Medical MalpracticeReview Panels, 11 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 525, 527 (1986). The
1972-1979 time period provided baseline data, because Arizona adopted its panel
system in 1976. See id. at 528. Shmanske and Stevens looked only at claims files
closed within two years after they were opened, and excluded claims for which the file
was opened in a year other than that in which the incident occurred. See id. They
found that the yearly rate of claim files opened per doctor was significantly higher
after the start of the panel system than before. See id. at 529-33. They theorized that
the increase they observed in claim frequency was due to the fact that panels "lower
the expected cost to plaintiffs of acquiring information about the outcome of their
lawsuits." Id. at 533.
260. For some claims that are resolved at or soon after the panel stage, the
plaintiff's litigation costs may be relatively low. This would be particularly true if the
plaintiff does not present an expert witness during the panel proceeding, and relies
instead on the panel's expertise. Moreover, some plaintiffs might hope that if they
succeed in front of the panel, they could call one or more panelists to testify at trial,
instead of retaining an expensive expert witness. Thus, a claimant whose primary
motive is to find a cause for an injury may take advantage of the panel procedure,
perhaps pro se, in order to obtain an expert assessment of what went wrong. In
addition, for some claims that would otherwise be too small to justify the cost of
litigation, panels might encourage claiming by providing patients with a lower-cost
way to evaluate the strength of claims, see Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the
Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. Health
Pol., Pol'y & L. 629, 636 (1985), and-in the event of a positive panel assessmentwith a low-cost expert witness for trial, see Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and
Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Spring 1986, at 57, 72.
261. Restrictions on pre-panel discovery would be particularly unfair to plaintiffs,
because plaintiffs are less likely than defendants to have informal access to
information concerning liability.
262. In one survey of judge, physician, and attorney panelists in Arizona, a large
majority of all three types of panelists stated that they could not have reached their
findings without such a hearing. See Dale Ann Howard, An Evaluation of Medical
Liability Review Panels in Arizona, St. Ct. J.,
Spring 1981, at 19, 24.
263. See Sloan, supra note 260, at 636.
264. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public
Policy 199 (1985). For example, a 1981 study of panels in Arizona asked attorneys to
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Though some of the costs of panel proceedings may be discoveryrelated, a substantial portion of the costs are likely to represent
attorney time and expert witness fees. A plaintiff who must go
will, in
through a panel proceeding in order to litigate her claims
2 65
twice."
case
her
"try
to
having
of
prospect
the
face
effect,
Panels may also lower plaintiffs' expected returns by delaying the
resolution of claims. 266 Although one study found that the existence
of a panel system was associated with a roughly one-year reduction in
time from filing to claim resolution, 6 7 some states have had severe
problems with delay.268
To the extent that panels make claiming more costly, panels may
discourage plaintiffs from initiating claims and may increase the
probability that plaintiffs who have asserted claims will drop them
without a settlement. 26 9 This dynamic may explain the results of a
estimate the additional expense attributable to panel hearings; the mean cost
(counting time and out-of-pocket expenses) reported by survey respondents was
between $3,000 and $4,000. See Howard, supra note 262, at 24. The cost of such a
proceeding will only have increased since 1981.
265. Frank M. McClellan, Medical Malpractice: Law, Tactics and Ethics 90 (1994).
266. The impact of this effect will vary depending on factors such as the availability
of prejudgment interest. See Robinson, supra note 244, at 29 ("[Tjhe availability of
prejudgment interest in a growing number of states partially offsets the cost to
claimants, and, even where such interest is not authorized explicitly, juries apparently
make an implicit allowance for it in setting general damages." (citation omitted)).
267. See Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Reforms on the Value of Closed
Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 663, 677
(1989).
268. For example, the Pennsylvania panel system was eventually held
unconstitutional, in Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1980), based on a
finding that the system caused such delay that it impermissibly burdened the state
constitutional right to a jury trial. Arizona, Indiana, Rhode Island, and New York
also experienced problems with panel delay. See Howard, supra note 262, at 21-22;
James D. Kemper et al., Reform Revisited: A Review of the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act Ten Years Later, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 1129, 1133 (1986); Shmanske &
Stevens, supra note 259, at 533; Betsy A. Rosen, Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice
Reform Act: The New York State Legislature Responds to the Medical Malpractice
Crisis with a Prescription For Comprehensive Reform, 52 Brook. L. Rev. 135, 162
(1986).
269. The panel assessment may facilitate settlement in some instances, by bringing
the parties' valuations of the case closer together. See Hughes, supra note 246, at 65;
Metzloff, supra note 246, at 442, 453. Some defense attorneys have stated that a
panel's finding of liability can help to persuade the physician defendant to consent to
settlement, which is a requirement in some insurance policies. See Barbara F. Klein,
Comment, A PracticalAssessment of Arizona's Medical MalpracticeScreening System,
1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 335, 348. On the other hand, panels may sometimes delay
settlement talks because parties may be inclined to hold off on serious settlement
discussions until they obtain the panel's assessment of the case. For example, in a
1990 survey of eighty-eight malpractice plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys in
Arizona, Jona Goldschmidt found that thirty-five percent of the respondents "agreed
or strongly agreed" with the statement that "there is no reason to enter into
meaningful settlement negotiations until a panel finding is made." Jona Goldschmidt,
Where Have All the Panels Gone? A History of the Arizona Medical Liability Review
Panel,23 Ariz. St. L.J. 1013, 1054-57 (1991).
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study of insurance company data which found that the presence of a
panel system "significantly increased the probability" that the plaintiff
would drop the claim.27 ° In that study, panels were also associated
with a decrease in the probability that claims would settle; combining
the probabilities of the claim being dropped or settled produced an
increased probability of pretrial resolution.2
Some might argue that to the extent panels encourage plaintiffs to
drop claims, panels are beneficial. However, that would be true only
if the claims that are dropped lack merit. 7 2 Plaintiffs who drop claims
because of expense and delay may be doing so only because the size of
the claim is insufficient to justify the expense. Moreover, even if
panel findings help to eliminate weaker claims, as proponents suggest,
it is hard to tell whether panels provide an overall benefit without
knowing whether the plaintiffs would have brought those claims if the
panel procedure had not been available: If panels encourage an
increase in claiming, if a portion of the additional claims are weak,
and if the panel findings then discourage the pursuit of those weak
claims, it would seem that little benefit arises from the panels in this
respect.273
In general, panels seem ill-designed to provide expertise to the jury.
Making the panel's findings admissible in later proceedings will tend
to increase the cost and length of panel proceedings. The prospect of
being called to testify may make physicians even less eager to serve on
panels, which could increase the already pronounced difficulties of
finding panelists. 4 Ironically, a requirement that panel physicians
must testify in court would be reminiscent of the coerced and
undercompensated testimony that nineteenth century physicians so
resented.
Nor do the benefits of panel findings outweigh these costs. As
noted above, some nine-tenths of malpractice suits are resolved prior
to trial; 271 it would be inefficient to require all claims to go before a
270. Hughes, supra note 246, at 75.
271. See id. at 75-77.
272. Cf. Goldschmidt, supra note 269, at 1109 ("Claims exclusion should not be the
measure of 'efficiency."').
273. A 1980 study cited figures indicating that plaintiffs who lost before panels
were less likely to proceed with their claims than plaintiffs who won before panels; the
study asserted that these data "may indicate.. . that screening panels are effectively
weeding out a number of unjustified claims." Peter E. Carlin, Medical Malpractice
Pre-Trial Screening Panels: A Review of the Evidence 30 (1980). However, as
Thomas Metzloff has pointed out, "Absent comparative insight into whether these
claims would in fact have been asserted in court in the absence of a panel procedure,
the conclusions drawn are questionable." Metzloff, supra note 183, at 215.
274. See Carlin, supra note 273, at 32-33 (discussing difficulties several state
systems encountered in obtaining panelists, and noting statements by some New
Jersey officials that the possibility of being called to testify at trial "deters many
doctors from participating as panelists").
275. See supra text accompanying note 177.
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panel in order to provide opinions in the one-tenth of claims that
eventually will reach a jury. In addition, not all cases that reach trial
will need a neutral expert's opinion; in some cases, the issues will be
relatively straightforward and the jury will be capable of sorting
through the testimony of the parties' experts.
In the small subset of cases where a neutral expert opinion could be
useful, it is questionable whether screening panels provide the best
source of such opinions. Medical screening panels-as this Article
defines them and as they are commonly understood-include at least
one physician, presumably in order to bring medical expertise to bear
on the issues. It is not obvious, however, that the presence of doctors
on the review panels will improve the panels' accuracy. As many
nineteenth century medico-legal writers commented, not all good
physicians make good experts; many medical questions that arise in
litigation may require expertise that a generalist practitioner does not
possess.
Admittedly, doctors will understand basic medical concepts more
readily than most lawyers, judges, or laypeople. On the other hand, to
the extent that the duty of care is set according to medical custom,
doctors may not have as much of a comparative advantage as one
would at first assume, because few practicing physicians will have
more than an anecdotal sense of the practices of other doctors.2 76
More generally, studies in other contexts have raised questions
concerning the degree to which multiple physicians are likely to agree
on the quality of care in a given case. A researcher who reviewed
twelve studies that provided data on the inter-rater reliability of
physicians' assessments of quality of care found that "[o]nly two of the
12 studies had indexes of chance-corrected agreement that were
consistently above .40, the minimum value for agreement that is better

than poor. "277

There is some question, as well, concerning doctors' willingness to
find other doctors liable; discussing a survey of New York physicians,
Weiler et al. "found marked variation among physicians in their
willingness to label certain kinds of medical outcomes as iatrogenic,
and an even more pronounced reluctance to label as negligent those
treatment decisions that, ex post at least, were clearly erroneous. "278
In the twenty-first century, as in the nineteenth, physicians may be
reluctant to hold their colleagues liable for errors in judgment that do
not rise to the level of gross neglect.2 79
276. See Cramm et al., supra note 190, at 710-12.
277. Ronald L. Goldman, The Reliability of Peer Assessments of Quality of Care,
267 JAMA 958, 958 (1992) (citations omitted).
278. Weiler et al., supra note 172, at 125.
279. Although Liang found that the anesthesiologists in his study had "a significant
propensity.., to be extremely critical of the defendant anesthesiologists in the cases"
they reviewed, he noted that this may have been because academic physicians are
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Medical screening panels reflect a paradoxical view of malpractice
cases: On one hand, proponents believe such cases are so complex
that better medical expertise is needed; on the other, proponents
assert that with proper encouragement, the parties can assess their
contentions and resolve the claims early in the process. Those
contradictory views give rise to the conflicting goals of providing an
accurate expert assessment for trial and resolving cases quickly and
cheaply prior to trial. These incompatible goals may help to explain
2
why panels have met with little success. 11
2. Specialized Courts
A different scheme for increasing decision maker expertise involves
the creation of a specialized medical liability court. One wellpublicized current proposal 281 for such a court comes from Common
Good, an organization that describes itself as "a bipartisan initiative to
overhaul America's lawsuit culture., 28 2 Common Good's assessment
of today's medical malpractice environment resembles the complaints
physicians made in the nineteenth century:
Justice today resembles a free-for-all. The lottery-like litigation
system, with lawyers taking over half the money, leaves some victims
without compensation at the same time that it provides huge
rewards for a few, often irrespective of fault. The random quality to
modern2justice
infects daily relations in healthcare with debilitating
83
distrust.

Common Good's proposal for specialized courts arises from the
organization's position that "expert judges" should create precedents
concerning the standard of care.2 4
Philip Howard, the most
prominent advocate of Common Good's specialized courts proposal,
argues that questions of standard of care should be viewed as
questions of law to be decided by the judge. 2 5 Howard asserts that
more willing to remark upon perceived flaws in other physicians' performance. Liang,
supra note 232, at 135.
280. See Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potentialof MalpracticeArbitration,
31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 203, 217 (1996) ("The conventional wisdom is that these
panels, which looked something like arbitration panels, were ineffective in impacting
the culture or reality of malpractice litigation; indeed, several states have recently
abandoned their programs." (citation omitted)).
281. See Stuart Taylor, Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, Newsweek, Dec. 15, 2003,
at 43, 51 (discussing the proposal).
282. Common Good, Common Good: Why We Have Come Together, at
http://cgood.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
283. Common Good, Common Good Petition: America Needs a New System of
Medical
Justice:
Current
Proposals
are
Not
Enough,
at
http://cgood.org/medicine/item?item id=19297 (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
284. Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed, The Best Course of Treatment, N.Y. Times, July 21,
2003, at A15.
285. See id. ("A reliable system of medical justice could take many forms, but
because the critical issue in virtually all cases is whether the doctor complied with
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judicial rulings on the standard of care would create a body of
precedent 28 on
which doctors could rely in making medical
6
judgments.
This proposal recalls the writings of some nineteenth century
medico-legal authors. John Elwell's 1860 treatise explicitly drew a
comparison between legal precedent and good medical practice:
What is well and clearly settled, either by the courts or by statute,
must be known and applied by the attorney, for it is only where
there may be a reasonable ground of difference of opinion, that he is
excusable for errors of judgment; so with the physician-he must
know what is well settled in his profession-for he will be held
responsible, if he fails to apply, in a particular case, what is settled in
the profession, as being applicable to the case.287
To this end, Elwell spent a number of pages setting forth standards of
care that he believed were "settled." For example, his third chapter
detailed "What Definite Knowledge is Possible and Essential for the
Physician and Surgeon., 288 Elwell did not, however, claim to be
describing standards that would last for decades; rather, he stressed
that physicians must keep abreast of improvements in medical
knowledge: "A medical man can not, with any safety or propriety,
practice, year after year, without keeping himself informed as to the
improvements of his science, especially if he practice surgery,
involving amputations, from
which so many law suits result, and which
289
are so fatal to the patient.,
As Elwell recognized, the standards of medical care change with
each advance in medical knowledge and technology; and even if the
standards were static, their application could vary depending on the
facts of each case. 29' Thus, under the current substantive law of
medical malpractice-which requires determinations of the standard
of care, breach, causation, and damages-a set of precedents on the
standard of care might not provide much lasting help.
However, it is certainly true that if judges were tasked with setting
"precedents" on the standard of care, then there would be a need for
expertise and consistency in their decisions. Even under the current
system, judges need some kinds of expertise in order successfully to
perform a number of tasks-for example: managing the case, ruling
appropriate standards of care, the key element must be expert judges ruling on
standards of care.").
286. See id. (noting the "value [of] predictability" and the fact that "[j]uries can't
make consistent rulings of what is reasonable care and what is not").
287. Elwell, supra note 24, at 36.
288. Id. at 48.
289. Id. at 56.
290. Foder6's remark that legal medicine constantly presents new and unforeseen
variations, see 1 Foderd, supra note 26, at vii ("Every day in legal medicine, as in
clinical medicine, there arise countless variations and cases that could not have been
foreseen." (author's translation)), continues to be true some two centuries later.
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on the admissibility of expert testimony, overseeing the trial, and
ruling on post-trial motions. Specialized courts might seem a good
way to improve performance in these respects.
The possible advantages of a specialized medical liability court
include expertise, decision making speed, and uniformity and
coherence of doctrine. Not only might the judges initially be selected
for their experience with medical liability cases, but once on the
bench, the judges would have the incentive and opportunity to
develop additional expertise in relevant areas.291 Expert judges might
be better equipped to evaluate the qualifications of expert
witnesses. 292 Moreover, to the extent that judicial review of damages
awards takes account of the amounts that have been awarded and
upheld in similar prior cases, specialized judges might be well
positioned to gain that comparative knowledge with respect to
medical liability cases. Expertise might also help judges to manage
cases more actively, with a view to resolving them more quickly. In
addition, the exclusivity of the court's jurisdiction over medical
liability cases would reduce the number of judges hearing those cases,
and thus might tend to increase somewhat the consistency of
decisions.
It should be recognized, though, that a specialized court carries
potential risks as well as possible benefits. If a specialized court
proposal is eventually implemented, it likely would be implemented at
the state level, and the judges might well be elected rather than
appointed. Such a court would run a considerable risk of becoming
intensely politicized. Commentators have long pointed out that the
more specialized a court is, the greater the incentives and
opportunities for interest groups to seek to influence the court's
decisions, both by lobbying to select judges who will favor the desired
position and by exerting pressure on the court for its decisions.2 93
Although interest groups on both sides of the medical liability
debate may seek to influence the selection of judges on a state's trial
court of general jurisdiction, their incentives to do so are dampened
by the fact that there are many such judges, each of whom will likely
hear a relatively small portion of the total group of medical liability
cases.
Moreover, a judicial candidate for a court of general
jurisdiction will be judged not only on her position on medical liability
issues but also on her stance on many other questions. By contrast,
291. David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal
Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 63 (1975);
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1995).
292. Gross, supra note 11, at 1181-82.
293. See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?
An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev.
761, 783 (1983); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative
Lawmaking System, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1149 (1990).
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the incentives are likely to be quite different with respect to the judges
of a specialized court-both because the number of judges is much
smaller, and because the court's jurisdiction extends only to medical
liability issues. Also, unlike a field such as patent law, where a repeat
player will likely be on different sides in different disputes, 294 it is
probable that a repeat player in the medical malpractice field will be
habitually on one side or the other 29 5-thereby increasing the player's
incentive to seek the selection of judges favorable to the player's
expected position.
Recent developments in judicial selection underscore the potential
dangers of politicization.296
A report by the American Bar
Association's Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary notes that in
a number of recent state judicial elections, campaigns have been
politicized due to the involvement of "interest groups that formed to
promote a specific political issue., 297 The ABA Commission focused
its discussion of this trend on elections for state high courts; but the
same concern would apply to a specialized lower court. Moreover,
recent changes to the rules for judicial election campaigns seem likely
to exacerbate the problem. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a Minnesota provision "prohibiting candidates for judicial election
from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues
violates the First Amendment. '298 As the ABA Commission noted,
"the White case is likely to politicize judicial elections as never
299
before.
The benefits and disadvantages of a specialized court will vary
depending on its structure and the structure of the court system it
supplements. It is possible that if a specialized court were staffed by
appointed judges, the selection process might be somewhat less
politicized. In many states, however, it may not be politically possible
to provide for appointed rather than elected judges. In any event, an
appointive system would not eliminate the risk of politicization.3 0
294. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1989); cf Rai, supra note 204, at 894
(advocating creation of "a specialized trial court" for patent cases "with lay judges
who [have] basic training in the scientific method, and who [are] given sufficient
resources to appoint experts liberally").
295. Physicians and insurance companies will be repeat players on the defense side;
plaintiffs' lawyers will be repeat players on the plaintiff side.
296. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Role of the Bar in Politicized Judicial
Elections, 39 Willamette L. Rev. 1349, 1351-52 (2003).
297. American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, Report:
Justice in Jeopardy 22 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Report].
298. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
299. ABA Report, supra note 297, at 90.
300. See Marvin Comisky & Philip C. Patterson, The Judiciary-Selection,
Compensation, Ethics, and Discipline 6 (1987) ("Critics of executive appointment
have pointed out that the typical chief executive is subject to political pressures based
on partisan considerations, and is also apt to expect a quid pro quo from his
appointees."); id. at 5 (noting that criticisms of legislative appointment of judges
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Thus, consideration should be given to alternative ways to increase
judicial expertise. If trial judges are found to lack expertise in
assessing the admissibility of expert testimony, judicial training
sessions could provide them with basic knowledge concerning the
scientific method, probabilistic evidence concerning causation, and
other relevant topics. Moreover, even if specialized judges are
desired, a specialized court is not the only way to provide them. A
specialized medical malpractice division could be created within a trial
court of general jurisdiction, and judges could rotate into and out of
that division.
This option could reduce the politicization and
perspective-narrowing problems identified above, while providing an
opportunity for judges to gain concentrated experience in malpractice
cases. A specialized division, moreover, would not force litigants to
travel large distances in order to litigate medical liability claims.
3. A Novel Approach to Remittitur
In 2002, Pennsylvania's legislature altered the remittitur standard in
medical malpractice cases by requiring the trial court to "consider
evidence of the [verdict's] impact, if any, upon availability or access to
health care in the community."301 The new statute provides no
guidance to the court concerning the method by which to assess such
impact. 3° A logical analysis of the provision suggests, however, that it
has the potential to operate in dramatically unfair ways.
The traditional remittitur analysis directs the court to reduce a
verdict if the verdict's size "shocks the conscience of the court. 30 3 A
more rigorous approach, discussed below in Part II.D.3., requires
reduction of the verdict if it "deviates materially" from what would be
"reasonable compensation." 3" Each of these standards takes into
account considerations such as the amount of money necessary to
compensate the plaintiff for current and future damages.
The
Pennsylvania legislature's enactment of a statute requiring the court
also to consider the verdict's effect on access to health care in the
community suggests the expectation that such analysis will result in
reduction where a more conventional standard would not.
include the observation "that legislators are too apt to be politically motivated in
selecting for judicial candidates").
301. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1303.515(a) (West Supp. 2003).
302. Pennsylvania's Civil Procedural Rules Committee has proposed a new rule to
implement the statute; the proposed rule specifies the procedure for making a motion
under the statute, but does not discuss what factors should be considered in
determining the motion. See Sup. Ct. of Pa., Civil Procedural Rules Comm., Proposed
Recommendation No. 189 (2003).
303. See, e.g., Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the FederalCourts:
An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 157, 187 (1987-88)
(citations omitted).
304. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1997); see also infra notes 353-54 and
accompanying text.
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To make the issue concrete, suppose that a jury awards a
catastrophically injured malpractice plaintiff $2 million in
compensatory damages, based mostly on the projected high cost of
lifetime care. It appears possible that such a verdict could be reduced
under the Pennsylvania standard-even if the verdict amount was
reasonable in light of the projected costs of lifetime care-if the court
believed that requiring the defendant to pay the judgment would
reduce the availability of health care in the community.
Leaving aside the obvious practical difficulties courts will encounter
in attempting to perform such an analysis, two conceptual issues stand
out. First, requiring consideration of the verdict's effect on access to
healthcare delegates to the medical community some authority to
effect reduction of the verdict: Presumably, if the three health care
providers in a small town all testify that they will leave town or cease
practice if the verdict stands, the court must consider that testimony in
determining whether to reduce the verdict. Second, this remittitur
provision attempts to solve a perceived social problem-diminished
access to health care-by imposing the problem's costs on a
particularly vulnerable and demonstrably deserving segment of
society-malpractice plaintiffs who have won a verdict that is not
subject to reduction on grounds of insufficient evidence.
4. Self-Help on the Part of the Medical Community
I conclude Part II.C. by discussing measures physicians are taking to
address their concerns with medical testimony in malpractice cases.
Although these measures exist independently of the procedural
reforms discussed here, they are noteworthy because in some ways
they constitute an effort on the part of some physicians to achieve
through self-help the same goals pursued by supporters of procedural
reform. One possible self-help measure might be for a successful
malpractice defendant to sue the plaintiff and/or the plaintiff's lawyer
for malicious prosecution. Such suits, however, are unlikely to
succeed;3 °5 and a current movement seeks instead to discipline doctors
who offer assertedly substandard testimony on behalf of plaintiffs.
As in the nineteenth century, there are some indications that
doctors are attempting to mobilize the profession to counteract
perceived defects in medical expert testimony. The movement today,
however, seems more coordinated and potentially more influential
than similar attempts in the nineteenth century. Several medical
professional associations, including the American Association of
Neurological Surgeons ("AANS"), have procedures by which
305. For a discussion of malicious prosecution claims and other claims a successful
malpractice defendant might consider asserting, see generally Sheila L. Birnbaum,
Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical
MalpracticeActions, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1003 (1977).
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association members can institute disciplinary proceedings against
fellow members for providing expert testimony.3" 6 Austin v. American
Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons3. 7 illustrates the issues at stake.
Donald Austin, a neurosurgeon who was suspended by the AANS
because of his testimony on behalf of a medical malpractice plaintiff,
sued the AANS for asserted violations of state law.308 A federal
district court, sitting in diversity, dismissed Austin's claims, and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.3" 9
Judge Posner's opinion for the court presented a benign view of the
AANS's disciplinary procedure. Judge Posner noted that the AANS
gave Dr. Austin "notice and a full hearing (with counsel) before a
panel of Association members not implicated in his dispute" with the
defendant in the prior malpractice suit.310 The court reviewed Dr.
Austin's trial testimony and concluded that "if the quality of his
testimony reflected the quality of his medical judgment, he is probably
a poor physician."3"' The court noted that all AANS complaints to
date concerning expert testimony had been brought against physicians
who had testified for plaintiffs; however, the court rejected Dr.
Austin's assertion that this fact indicated bias on the part of the
AANS.3 12 In the court's view, the "asymmetry" was merely a result of
the fact that AANS complaints can only be initiated by AANS
members and malpractice defendants were more likely to complain
than were members who had testified on behalf of a plaintiff.313
Though the court noted that "[n]o doubt most members of the AANS
are hostile to malpractice litigation," the court observed that "[j]udges
need the help of professional associations in screening experts," and it
concluded that "this kind of professional
self-regulation rather
3 14
furthers than impedes the cause of justice.
The Seventh Circuit may have taken a somewhat optimistic view of
procedures such as the AANS's. If it is the case, as the court
appeared to assume, that only AANS members can bring complaints
concerning a member's expert testimony, the procedure appears
designed to favor malpractice defendants: A malpractice plaintiff
306. See Adam Liptak, Doctors' Testimony Under Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, July 6,
2003, at A10. In addition, a nonprofit organization called the Coalition and Center
for Ethical Medical Testimony has been formed "to make honesty and ethicality the
sine qua non of physicians and others engaged in healthcare who serve as expert
witnesses, and to eliminate the ability of unethical experts to testify with impunity in
medical-legal matters." Coalition & Ctr. for Ethical Med. Testimony, Statement of
Purpose 2003, at http://www.ccemt.orglindex.pl/mission.
307. 253 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2001).
308. Id. at 968.
309. See id. at 971, 974.
310. Id. at 969.
311. Id. at 974.
312. See id. at 972.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 972-73.
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cannot initiate AANS complaints, unless the malpractice plaintiff also
happens to be a neurosurgeon and a member of the AANS.31 5

Even apart from this imbalance, there is some question whether a
procedure such as the AANS's is the best way to monitor expert
testimony. The weaknesses that the Seventh Circuit panel identified
in Dr. Austin's testimony were the sort of issues that a well-prepared
and knowledgeable defense counsel would explore on crossexamination.3 16
Though Judge Posner argued that the AANS

members who conducted the AANS proceeding were much more
adroit than a malpractice defendant's lawyer would be, it is worth
noting that the verdict in the underlying malpractice case was for the
malpractice defendant-which suggests that the jury may have
rejected Dr. Austin's testimony.3 17
A review of the performance of the AANS disciplinary procedure
315. An AANS member who had testified for a plaintiff presumably could bring a
complaint concerning the testimony of the defendant's expert witness. It seems likely,
however, that malpractice plaintiffs and defendants would have greater incentives to
bring such complaints than expert witnesses would. Thus, the rule that only AANS
members can initiate complaints seems likely to render complaints against plaintiffs'
experts more probable than complaints against defendants' experts.
316. As the Seventh Circuit stated:
Austin had been retained to testify on behalf of a woman whose recurrent
laryngeal nerve was permanently damaged in the course of an anterior
cervical fusion performed by Dr. Ditmore .... According to the testimony
that Austin was permitted to give at trial, he believes and "the majority of
neurosurgeons" would concur that the plaintiff could not have suffered a
permanent injury to her recurrent laryngeal nerve unless Dr. Ditmore had
been careless, because she had no anatomical abnormality that might have
enabled such an injury to result without negligence on the surgeon's partthough in the disciplinary hearing it emerged that, because the recurrent
laryngeal nerve is difficult to see, and often is not seen during the operation,
it may be impossible to determine whether the particular patient's nerve is
unusually susceptible to injury. Austin testified that Ditmore must have
rushed the operation (though there was no other evidence of that) and as a
result retracted the tissues adjacent to the recurrent laryngeal nerve too
roughly.... [But] Austin could hardly be considered an expert on anterior
cervical fusion, having performed only 25 to 30 of them in more than 30
years in practice, although he had performed a large number of other
cervical operations. Ditmore in contrast had performed 700 anterior cervical
fusions-with exactly one case of permanent damage to a patient's recurrent
laryngeal nerve, namely the case of the patient who had sued him.
Dr. Austin claimed at the hearing that he had based his opinion on [two
articles]....
Neither article supports Austin's testimony.... Austin admitted that he
hadn't discussed the matter with any other medical professionals....
... Asked on cross-examination at the malpractice trial to explain why the
medical literature did not confirm his view of what a majority of
neurosurgeons think, Austin responded lamely that the "medicolegal
atmosphere that we're in these days" had deterred the surgical community
from acknowledging that this particular complication of anterior cervical
fusion could occur only through the surgeon's negligence.
Id. at 969-71.
317. See id. at 973.
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and others like it lies beyond the scope of this Article. However, even
if the AANS procedure reaches correct results, and disciplines only
those experts whose testimony is demonstrably substandard, it is
questionable whether such procedures are the best avenue for
improving medical testimony. It is true, as Judge Posner pointed out,
that neurosurgeons need not be members of the AANS in order to
practice.318
Some similar measures might, however, affect a
physician's ability to practice: A published report indicates that the
Florida Medical Association adopted in the mid-1990s a program
under which complaints concerning expert testimony could result in
license suspension or revocation by the state medical board.3" 9
To observers familiar with the history of malpractice litigation, such
procedures might seem slightly reminiscent of the control that local
medical societies exercised over the availability of medical expert
testimony during the early twentieth century. 320 For this reason, the
appearance of fairness-and perhaps actual fairness as well-could be
better served by exploring other means of improving the quality of
expert testimony.
D. The Existence of ProceduralAlternatives
As the preceding section has demonstrated, reforms that increase
unduly the influence of physicians in medical liability litigation run the
risk of the appearance, if not the reality, of unfairness. This section
discusses alternatives that may help improve the performance of
judges and juries without ceding inappropriate amounts of power to
the medical community.
1. Less-Adversarial Use of Experts
In general, the U.S. system of litigation is founded on the notion
that adversarial procedures help to produce accurate and acceptable
results. As Daniel Shuman explains:
The adversarial model assumes we are more likely to uncover the
truth about a contested event as the result of the efforts of the
parties who have a self-interest in the discovery of proof and
exposing the frailties of an opponent's proof than from the efforts of
a judge charged only with an official duty to investigate the case.
The adversarial model also assumes that the parties' participation in
the investigation and telling of their story, and the use of a decision
maker who is independent of the investigation of the case, will

318. See id. at 971.
319. See Michael Higgins, Docking Doctors?:AMA Eyes Disciplinefor Physicians
Giving "False" Testimony, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at 20.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 156-59.
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enhance support of the judicial system and confidence in its
decisions.32'
However, as nineteenth century physicians pointed out, the
adversary system can sometimes make it difficult for the decision
to assess expert
makers-judges and juries-appropriately
qualifications and expert testimony. The nineteenth century medicolegal debates produced a number of proposals for addressing this
problem; although some of those proposals are unpromising, others
have twenty-first century counterparts that are worth consideration.
Current initiatives to educate judges and to seek nonpartisan expertise
in appropriate cases could be particularly helpful.322
Contemporary critiques of certain nineteenth century proposals are
equally valid today. As Henry Wade Rogers pointed out in 1883, a
system of permanent government-employed medical experts would
limit parties' ability to present testimony from the most
knowledgeable specialists.323 Likewise, if only the court, and not
counsel, were to examine the experts at trial, the presentation of
issues might suffer because the court would likely not be as familiar
with relevant details.324
On the other hand, the general thrust of Samuel Gross's 1868
proposal32 5 -that the court should obtain assistance in managing
expert testimony-is the basis for several promising developments.
First, judges have recognized that they require assistance and training
in order to master the issues in cases involving complex scientific
evidence.3 26 The Federal Judicial Center has published a manual
The National
designed to educate judges in this respect.3 27
Academies' Science, Technology, and Law Program endeavors "to
bring together the science and engineering community and the legal
community to explore pressing issues, improve communication and
help resolve issues between the two communities."328 The National

321. Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J.Health
Pol., Pol'y & L. 267, 269 (2001) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure
(4th ed. 1992); Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1992)).
322. See Rai, supra note 204, at 892 (arguing that "[iln technically complex cases
involving conflicting expert testimony .... reducing the adversarial component"
through "use of third-party expertise" may be useful).
323. See supra text accompanying note 137.
324. See supra text accompanying note 138.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07. For an early proposal concerning
possible ways to assist judges in handling scientific questions, see Harold Leventhal,
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509,
546-54 (1974).
327. See Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (2d ed. 2000).
328. The Nat'l Academies, Science, Technology, and Law Program, at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
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Center for State Courts promotes3 29programs to increase judges'
understanding of scientific principles.

Better training in scientific principles will assist judges in assessing
whether to admit the testimony of party-retained experts. In cases
presenting especially difficult scientific questions, the court might also
wish to consider appointing a nonpartisan expert to aid in the
assessment of the qualifications of the parties' experts or to testify at
trial.3

A number of resources exist to help judges make use of court-

appointed experts. Examples include the American Association for
the Advancement of Science's Court Appointed Scientific Experts
project331 and Duke University Law School's Registry of Independent
Scientific and Technical Advisors.332
Most cases will not require court-appointed experts. In a 1998
survey of federal trial judges, some 74% of respondents reported that

they never made use of such experts; roughly 16% of respondents
indicated that they used court-appointed experts "exclusively in cases
'333
with difficult or complicated scientific and technical evidence.

Schwarzer and Cecil note the likelihood that "the need for such
appointments will be infrequent and will be characterized by evidence
that is particularly difficult to comprehend, or by a failure of the

adversarial system to provide the information '33necessary
to sort
4
through the conflicting claims and interpretations.
In appropriate cases, though, testimony by a court-appointed expert

may aid the jury in making sense of the relevant issues.335 Such an
expert can "tutor[] and advis[e] the decisionmaker, supplement[] the
329. See Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Science, Technology and the Law, Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://www.ncsconline.org/WCDS/Topics/topicl.asp?searchvalue=Science,%20Technology%20and%20the%2Law (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
330. In federal court,
Two principal sources of authority permit a court to appoint an expert, each
envisioning a somewhat different role .... Appointment under Federal
Rule of Evidence 706 anticipates that the appointed expert will function as a
testifying witness ....
Supplementing the authority of Rule 706 is the broader inherent
authority of the court to appoint experts who are necessary to enable the
court to carry out its duties. This includes authority to appoint a "technical
advisor" to consult with the judge during the decision-making process.
William W. Schwarzer & Joe S. Cecil, Management of Expert Evidence, in Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 39, 59 (2d ed. 2000).
331. See http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2004).
332. See The Registry of Indep. Scientific & Technical Advisors, A Program of the
Private
Adjudication
Center:
Duke
University
School
of Law, at
http://www.law.duke.edu/PAC/registry/index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
333. Krafka et al., supra note 19, at 316 n.6, 325, 326 tbl. 5.
334. Schwarzer & Cecil, supra note 330, at 61.
335. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 7-8 (arguing that partisan experts ordinarily
"have every incentive to take as radical a position as possible," and that, by contrast,
the use of a nonpartisan expert will "moderate" the testimony of the parties' experts
by motivating those experts "to demonstrate how their views relate to those of the
court-appointed expert").
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available information, provid[e] an independent opinion, evaluat[e]
party testimony," and "analyze the conflicts between the party
experts. 33 6 Courts should be wary of presenting such an expert's
testimony as definitive, because "scientific disciplines are often
characterized by debate and disagreement, so that the views of any
one expert may not reflect a general consensus. 33 7 Moreover, care
should be taken to involve the parties in the selection process, to
assess the expert's neutrality, and to control the circumstances under
which the expert communicates with the judge, the parties, and other
experts.33 8 Subject to these precautions, a court-appointed expert may
prove useful in cases presenting particularly difficult or contentious
scientific issues.
The 1998 survey indicated that federal judges use a number of other
strategies with respect to expert testimony. Among the most popular
measures (measures which at least 82% of respondents said they used
at least some of the time) were "[a]sk[ing] clarifying questions of
experts from the bench," "requiring or encouraging early exchange
of" expert reports, and using "a special verdict, or a general verdict
' As the latter measure suggests, approaches to
with interrogatories."339
expert testimony may relate closely to the way in which the jury's role
is structured; the next subsection takes up that topic.
2. Jury Reforms
As seen in Part I, nineteenth century critiques of adversarial expert
testimony focused on the system's effect on the performance of judges
and experts. Recent social science scholarship has pointed out that
the adversarial model also may make it more difficult for jurors to
understand and apply the testimony presented by expert witnesses. In
this view, another problem with the adversarial model is that it treats
jurors as passive receptors of information presented by the plaintiff
and defendant.'
Social scientists dispute the notion of juror passivity, and jury
reformers argue that the promotion of active learning by jurors can
improve jury performance.34
Recent studies have generated a
number of proposed reforms.342 Moreover, the adoption of such
336. Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism
Meets Bias and Deference, 77 Or. L. Rev. 59, 84, 93 (1998).
337. Id. at 63.
338. See id. at 143-55.
339. Krafka et al., supra note 19, at 314, 326 tbl. 5.
340. See Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial
Ideal, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 85, 87 (2002).
341. See id. at 88-90.
342. See, e.g., Greene & Bornstein, supra note 196, at 765 (arguing that "jurors'
determinations of damages could be assisted by preinstructions and by removing the
blindfold on various provisions of damages doctrine," and that "bifurcation and
special verdict forms may be helpful in certain circumstances").
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reforms in jurisdictions around the country provides the opportunity
for empirical study of their effects.
A growing number of courts and commentators argue that juries
would perform better if trial procedures promoted active learning and
comprehension on the part of jurors.343 Some proposed reforms
address the timing of trial presentations. For example, judges could
instruct jurors on the substantive law before as well as after the
presentation of the evidence, and could permit lawyers to make
statements periodically during the trial to introduce or summarize
portions of the evidence.3"
In cases involving complex expert
evidence, the court could direct the defendant's expert to testify right
after the plaintiff's expert.34 5 Other proposals seek to enhance jurors'
understanding and retention of relevant law and facts by providing
them with tangible aids, such as written copies of the jury instructions
and juror notebooks containing copies of key exhibits.34 6 Still further
proposals would permit jurors to take notes and to submit questions
for the court to pose to witnesses."
Social science research on these proposals is ongoing, and the
recent adoption of reforms by some court systems provides an
opportunity to assess how the proposals function in practice. Studies
exist concerning many of the proposed reforms, such as juror notetaking, juror questioning, and the provision of preliminary and/or
interim jury instructions before or during trial. 8
Moreover,
jurisdictions such as Arizona, Colorado, and the District of Columbia
have implemented or encouraged the use of various reforms.349
Such reforms hold the promise of improving jury performance
overall. One specific issue of jury performance stands out as a matter
of concern, however: the variability of jury awards of noneconomic
damages.

343. See, e.g., Jury Trial Innovations 5, 14-15 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds.,
1997) (Vicki L. Smith contributor).
344. See Jury Trial Innovations, supra note 343, at 151-56.
345. See Krafka et al., supra note 19, at 316 n.6, 326 tbl. 5 (stating that 10% of
respondents in the 1998 survey of federal judges reported having used this approach).
346. See Jury Trial Innovations, supra note 343, at 109-11, 174-76.
347. See Jury Trial Innovations, supra note 343, at 141-47; Krafka et al., supra note
19, at 316 n.6, 326 (stating that some 16% of respondents in 1998 survey of federal
judges reported having "[a]llow[ed] jurors to question experts directly or through the
court").
348. See, e.g., Martin J. Bourgeois et al., Nominal and Interactive Groups: Effects of
Preinstructionand Deliberationson Decisions and Evidence Recall in Complex Trials,
80 J. Applied Psychol. 58 (1995); Lynne ForsterLee & Irwin A. Horowitz, Enhancing
Juror Competence in a Complex Trial, 11 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 305 (1997);
Lynne ForsterLee et al., Juror Competence in Civil Trials: Effects of Preinstruction
and Evidence Technicality, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 14 (1993).
349. See American Judicature Society, Enhancing the Jury System: A Guidebook
for Jury Reform 21-23, 27-30 (1999).
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3. Remittitur Under a Heightened Standard

The size and variability of noneconomic damages awards are central

concerns in discussions of malpractice reform.

A number of

commentators have observed that caps on damages are a suboptimal
way to limit award variability, because they impact unfairly the most

severely injured plaintiffs.5 0

Providing more guidance concerning

noneconomic damages could avoid such unfairness while still reducing
variability.
There are a number of possible ways to provide such guidance to
the jury. For example, Diamond, Saks, and Landsman suggest that
lawyers could be permitted to frame their arguments concerning
damages in the light of prior awards in cases they consider
comparable.3 5 '
Likewise, Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein have
suggested that juries could be given one or more stylized scenarios
and associated valuations, to use as benchmarks in considering how
much to award.352

Alternatively, instead of presenting such an argument to the jury,
lawyers could be required to make a similar case to the judge.

Traditionally, judges in most jurisdictions have had the power to order
remittitur based on a finding that the jury's damages award was so

large that it "shocked the conscience" of the court. This standard,
however, does not explicitly require the court to compare the verdict
under review to verdicts approved in previous cases.
A number of commentators have argued that such a comparison
could reduce the variability of awards for noneconomic damages. For
example, as Diamond, Saks, and Landsman discuss, since 1986 New
York State has mandated that the judge order remittitur (or additur)
if the judge determines that the jury's award "deviates materially from
350. Indeed, some research suggests that caps might actually increase both the size
and variability of jury awards in many cases, because of the potential anchoring effect
if jurors know of the cap. In a recent experiment, Saks et al. found that the mean
award for a low-severity injury by mock jurors who were told of the existence of a
$250,000 cap on damages was significantly higher than mean awards by jurors who
were not told of the cap, and that the awards by jurors told of the cap were
significantly more variable than awards by other jurors. See Michael J. Saks et al.,
Reducing Variabilityin Civil Jury Awards, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 243, 249, 251, 25354 (1997). Though this study looked at mock jurors and not at mock juries, it is still
suggestive, at least in the absence of evidence that group deliberation would change
the results. Although jurors in an actual trial setting might not be told of the
existence of a cap, the publicity surrounding legislative deliberation over caps makes
it likely that at least one juror would be aware of the cap's existence, and that
information could be communicated to other jurors during deliberations.
351. See Diamond et al., supra note 236, at 321.
352. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 953-56. Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein
also suggest that awards could be set by means of "a matrix of values that would
award fixed damage amounts according to the severity of injury and age of the injured
party," or that awards could be constrained by "a system of flexible floors and ceilings
that vary with injury severity and victim age." Id. at 938-39.
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what would be reasonable compensation"-a directive that courts

have interpreted to entail a comparison of the award in question with
prior awards in similar cases.353 One study examined samples of
medical malpractice verdicts from New York, Florida, and California,
and found a relatively high number of New York cases in which
malpractice verdicts were reduced through remittitur-a finding
which suggests that the New York standard is serving its intended
function.354
III. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND THE QUESTION OF TRANSSUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURE

I have argued, so far, that to assess proposed reforms of the
procedures for adjudicating medical liability cases, policymakers
should consider both data on malpractice claims and larger questions
concerning the relation of physicians to the lay community. Implicit
in this approach is the notion that such reforms should be considered
on a substance-specific basis-in other words, that the assessment
should focus on medical malpractice and not other areas of
353. See Diamond et al., supra note 236, at 322 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c)
(McKinney 1986)). Since 1986, New York's mid-level appellate courts have been
directed by statute to "determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it
deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation," N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5501(c) (McKinney 1997), and the New York courts have interpreted this standard as
applying at the trial level as well. See, e.g., Shurgan v. Tedesco, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658
(App. Div. 1992). The "deviates materially" standard is easier to meet than the more
traditional test (under which a court would grant remittitur only if the jury's award
"shocked the conscience" of the court).
Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth present a detailed proposal for
comparative judicial review of jury awards. See David Baldus et al., Improving
Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposalfor the Comparative
Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive
Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109 (1995). For a discussion of the challenges of
comparative review, and an illustration of one approach to those challenges, see
Geressy v. Digital Equipment Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 653-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(Weinstein, J.) (applying New York's "deviates materially" standard to jury awards
for, inter alia, pain and suffering). See also Diamond et al., supra note 236, at 322
(discussing Geressy).
354. The researchers found that in a sample of 293 medical malpractice plaintiff
verdicts described in a jury verdict reporter for New York City and neighboring
counties during 1985-1997, at least 96 awards were diminished post-verdict: 46
through post-verdict settlement, 23 through remittitur, 17 due to comparative
negligence, and 10 for unknown reasons. Because of these reductions, the mean
adjusted award in the New York sample was only about 62% of the mean original
jury award. See Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and PostVerdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 265, 285 (1998).
Vidmar et al. noted that these figures likely underestimate the total number of
post-verdict reductions, because the results of appeals were not included. See id. at
286. (The researchers found three post-verdict increases, as well: two from postverdict settlements, and one from additur (the converse of remittitur). See id. at 285.)
The researchers also studied samples of verdicts from Florida (1987-1996) and
California (1991-1997). The data indicate that the post-verdict experience in those
two states differs from that in New York. Id. at 290-99.
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substantive law. In one sense, this notion is simply a practical one:
The reforms discussed in Part II.C. specifically target medical liability
cases, and not other disputes.
My focus has theoretical as well as practical implications, however.
Procedural scholars have long debated whether federal procedural
rules should attempt to be trans-substantive, or whether such rules
instead should be tailored to accommodate distinctive features of
particular types of litigation. In Part III.A., I briefly summarize this
debate. Part III.B. considers how the insights drawn from the federal
debate might affect consideration, at the state level, of responses to
the perceived malpractice crisis.
A. The Debate Over Federal Trans-SubstantiveRules
On their surface, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appear to
make few, if any, distinctions among types of cases. However, by
conferring broad discretion on federal trial judges, the rules in fact
permit those judges to apply different procedures in different cases:
Many if not most Federal Rules make no policy choices. Rather,
they confer discretion on the trial judge, thereby insulating the
Rules from effective challenges under the statute delegating
rulemaking power to the Supreme Court, enabling tailored justice at
a level where policy choices-made by judges-may not be noticed,
and (with other factors) insulating those choices from effective
appellate review. Such Federal Rules are trans-substantive only in
the most trivial sense. 5
Some commentators argue that this trial-court flexibility is
beneficial. In their view, procedures can be tailored to substantive
needs, on an ad hoc basis, with less risk of arousing interest group
pressure concerning the substantive effects of those variations.356 By
contrast, if the federal rulemakers considered rules targeted at specific
kinds of litigation, the resulting rules would favor the interests of
those groups that were best able to influence the rulemaking
process.357 For example, some of the litigation successes of politically
disadvantaged groups have resulted from the ability of those groups to
employ trans-substantive rules in ways that interest groups would
likely have mobilized to oppose had substance-specific rules been
proposed.358
Other scholars, however, assert that the discretion conferred by the

355. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedureand Power, 46 J. Legal Educ. 513, 514 (1996).
356. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2067, 2083, 2085 (1989).
357. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2237, 2246-47 (1989).
358. See id.
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Federal Rules may be abused by trial judges,359 and that explicit
consideration of substance-specific rules would be preferable.3"
These scholars point out that maintaining a facial appearance of trans3 61
substantivity does not remove politics from the rulemaking process.
Considering substance-specific rules would merely make explicit the
underlying political issues; and such an approach would permit closer
consideration of the likely effect of the proposed rule.362 In addition,
the resulting rules may be more useful: Rules targeted at particular
types of cases could provide greater specificity, and thus greater
guidance to litigants and judges.363
Substance-specific rulemaking is complicated, at the federal level,
by the division of power between Congress and the rulemakers:
Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules must not "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right."3 " As a result, the debate
over federal rulemaking does not map directly onto the discussion of
procedural reforms in medical malpractice.3 6
Those reforms
generally begin their career as proposals in the state legislature, rather
than as rules considered by a court rulemaking body. As will be seen
in the next section, however, a number of the same themes emerge in
the state-law malpractice context.
B. Trans-Substantivityand State-Level Medical Liability Reform
Malpractice reform has the highest political profile of any current
type of litigation reform. Insurance companies and physicians' groups
present the issue as a medical liability crisis, and politicians respond in
the same vein. That being so, it is perhaps inevitable that proposals
are made for malpractice-specific procedural changes. As noted
above, action by a state legislature to target procedures in specific
types of cases does not raise the same separation of powers concerns
as would a similar initiative by federal rulemakers. Moreover, in the
present context, the question of substance-specific procedure should
be measured against the likely political alternative, substance-specific
substance: Procedures that are specific to medical liability cases may
be instituted as an alternative to substantive measures such as a cap
on malpractice damages. In such an environment, substance-specific
359. Cf Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure:
The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1937-38 (1989).
360. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the
Casefor Selective Substance-Specific Procedure,46 Fla. L. Rev. 27, 41, 49 (1994).
361. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1463, 1473
(1987) (book review).
362. See id.; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme
Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 718 (1988);
Subrin, supra note 360, at 54.
363. See Subrin, supra note 360, at 49.
364. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2003).
365. Cf Burbank, supra note 361, at 1475.
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procedure may be the best choice among the realistic policy options.
However, policymakers should take care, if they adopt substancespecific measures, that they do so on the basis of malpractice-specific
empirical study rather than simply on the basis of interest-group
pressure.
Political realities, then, justify substance-specific consideration of
malpractice litigation procedures. In addition, some of the issues
discussed in Parts I and II suggest the presence of concerns that are
distinctively powerful in the medical malpractice context. Although
malpractice litigation seems quite similar, in many ways, to other
state-court tort litigation, some differences appear, such as the
unusually low plaintiff win rate at trial.366 For current purposes,
perhaps the clearest distinguishing attributes of malpractice litigation
center on the nature of the defendant.
Concerns over defensive medicine and doctor attrition add to the
impulse for procedural reform. To the extent that physicians engage
in defensive medicine or leave practice, they may do so in part
because of their perception of the litigation system as random and
unfair. Reforms that increase physicians' faith in the litigation system
might thus hold the promise of reducing the incidence of defensive
medicine and encouraging physicians to stay in key specialties or
underserved communities.
On the other hand, if such reforms
produce unfair results or reduce the confidence of other participants
in the process, such success would come at too high a cost.367
Another distinctive feature of medical liability litigation lies in the
fact that physicians are both potential defendants and potential
experts. Of course, in many fields of endeavor, those with technical
knowledge may at different times testify as an expert, or find
themselves associated with a defendant in litigation, or both.
Scientists, for example, serve as expert witnesses; they also may be
connected, by employment or through grants, with entities that
typically may be defendants in products liability cases. It seems likely,
however, that few fields other than medical liability present such a
direct and personal overlap between potential witnesses and potential
defendants.
The overlap between defendants and experts in medical liability
cases was intensified, in the early twentieth century, by the locality
rule, which required that expert testimony come from one who
practiced in the defendant's community. The overlap in the twentyfirst century may be heightened by requirements that the expert
practice in the same specialty as the defendant. Moreover, some parts
366. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
367. A dramatic case in point is Pennsylvania's remittitur provision, which
apparently would require reduction of an award of compensatory damages solely
because the court anticipated that doctors would leave the community in response to
the award. See supra text accompanying note 301.

1014

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

of the medical community appear to be attempting to control more
stringently the testimony of medical experts.368

These factors may support the consideration of reforms specific to
medical liability cases. All other things being equal, procedural
changes may be particularly helpful in malpractice cases to the extent
that they either increase physician confidence in the litigation system
or remove the impetus for detrimental self-help measures by the

medical community.
To provide further definition to the analysis, it is useful not only to
assess procedural reforms with respect to medical liability (as opposed
to litigation in general), but also to consider how the system's
procedural aspects could change in the face of alterations in the
substantive law of medical liability.3 69 This Article has based its

discussion of litigation procedures on the assumption that the current
substantive law of medical malpractice applies.

A number of

commentators, however, advocate major changes in the substantive

law.3 70 For example, one proposal would replace the current system of

fault-based liability with a system in which claimants are compensated
if their injuries fall within "avoidable classes of events" ("ACEs")bad results that are clearly preventable.3 71 "Avoidable classes" would

be specified in advance by experts using empirical data on medical
safety, removing the need for individual determinations, in many
cases, of whether a physician breached the standard of care and
whether the breach caused the claimant's injury.
ACEs-based
provisions would obviate a number of the liability-focused concerns
that have motivated procedural reform, though it would still be
necessary to develop guidelines for the determination of damages.
Thus, changes in substantive medical liability law would change the

landscape of procedural reform as well.
Having considered medical-liability reform, it makes sense to
broaden the inquiry to ask whether insights gained with respect to
malpractice could apply elsewhere as well.

As a matter of recent

368. See supra text accompanying notes 306-19.
369. Cf Shuman, supra note 321, at 286 ("Many of the problems that courts face in
assessing medical expertise are the inevitable result of substantive legal standards.").
370. In addition to the "avoidable classes of events" approach discussed in the text,
reform ideas include proposals for enterprise liability, see, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham
& Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American
Health Care System, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 415-26 (1994); William M. Sage et al.,
EnterpriseLiability for Medical Malpracticeand Health Care Quality Improvement, 20
Am. J.L. & Med. 1, 16-26 (1994), and no-fault compensation, see, e.g., Randall R.
Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Faultfor MedicalInjury: Theory And Evidence, 67 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 53, 64-70 (1998); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a
Workable Model of "No-Fault" Compensationfor Medical Injury in the United States,
27 Am. J.L. & Med. 225, 229-35 (2001).
371. Bovbjerg, supra note 174, at 2197-98; see also Institute of Medicine of the
National Academies, Fostering Rapid Advances in Health Care: Learning from
System Demonstrations 83 (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2002).
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history, it is worth noting that while the wave of legislation in the
1970s focused on reforms specific to medical malpractice cases, the
wave of similar measures in the 1980s imposed "tort reform" more
generally.3 72 As a political matter, then, medical liability reforms may
provide an impetus for reforms in other areas of law.
In addition, as a matter of sound policy, some reforms that may be
useful in medical liability cases may also be helpful in other kinds of
cases. Policymakers should consider the application of expert witness
reforms and jury reforms to other types of cases-such as products
liability cases-that may present challenging scientific or technical
questions. Likewise, it makes sense to investigate whether other kinds
of cases-perhaps other personal injury actions-tend to result in
variable noneconomic damages awards that could usefully be
reviewed under a more stringent remittitur standard.
Those reforms might usefully be adopted in a "function-specific,"
rather than "substance-specific," manner-for example, based on the
degree of scientific complexity rather than based on the topic of the
claim.373 A "function-specific" measure could apply to more than one
type of case. It also could apply to fewer than all cases within a
specific category. Some commentators tend to imply that all medical
malpractice trials require the jury to address complex scientific
questions.374 In reality, however, malpractice cases vary considerably
in their degree of complexity and scientific difficulty.375 Thus, for
example, not all malpractice cases will require special approaches to
expert testimony or procedures to foster active learning by jurors.
This variation underscores the inefficiency of approaches, such as
screening panels or specialized courts, that would institute a costly
procedure based on concerns that arise only in a portion of
malpractice cases.
CONCLUSION

This Article was prompted by the notion of malpractice
exceptionalism-the idea that medical liability cases may require
litigation procedures that other kinds of cases do not need. The
political reality behind this notion is that physicians and insurers have
succeeded in presenting the medical liability problem as a crisis that is
unique and that requires drastic, malpractice-specific reform.
Behind the political landscape lies a social and historical reality that
warrants malpractice-specific analysis. In sorting through the tangle
372. See Weiler et al., supra note 172, at 3.
373. See Marcus, supra note 4, at 779.
374. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, The Need to Reform Personal Injury Law
Leaving Scientific Disputes to Scientists, 248 Science 823, 823-24 (1990).
375. Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving
Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 Emory L.J. 885,
896-99 (1994).
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of issues regarding medical liability, policymakers should be aware
that some key issues concern the way in which the medical community
interacts with the legal system. The latter often looks to the medical
community to define the standard of appropriate medical care and to
provide expertise needed to resolve contested issues. Tensions have
persisted over time, however, based both on the medical community's
frustration with the adversarial litigation system and on the tendency
of some medical communities, at some points in time, to assert undue
control over the outcomes of medical liability disputes.
Medical liability reform,
then, is targeted
toward an
interdisciplinary phenomenon: the intersection of medicine and law.
Relatedly, I have argued that the proper assessment of such reform
requires an interdisciplinary analysis. Drawing upon historians' work
on nineteenth century medico-legal developments and upon sources
from the period, Part I reviewed the ways in which the nineteenth
century debate prefigured current problems. Part II made use of
recent social science research to assess the performance of judges,
juries, and particular procedural reforms in medical liability litigation.
I argued in Part II that some of the procedural changes that physicians
might prefer are inadvisable, but that other approaches-particularly
reforms of expert witness procedures, efforts to promote active
learning by jurors, and a more stringent remittitur standard-may
prove useful.
Part III considered whether the questions addressed in this Article
really ought to be viewed as specific to medical malpractice cases, or
whether the procedures I advocate could apply to other areas as well.
I suggested that those procedures might be useful in some other types
of cases, and that such procedures might be applied on a functionspecific, rather than a topic-specific, basis.
Some readers may not be persuaded, in the abstract, that substancespecific procedures are needed to address medical liability reform.
However, experience supports the argument that procedural reforms
should be analyzed on a substance-specific basis. Reforms targeted at
medical liability are a political reality, and the only question is
whether their adoption will be driven solely by interest-group politics
or informed by sound substance-specific analysis.

